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1 
 
ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION OF 
NON-CITIZENS  
“It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards  
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies  
involving not very nice people.”1 
 
–Justice Felix Frankfurter 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, Santos Hernandez–Carrera, a refugee from Cuba,2 was 
convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to six years in prison.3 He 
was released from prison in 1993, and, if he had been a United States 
citizen, he might now be a free man. But because he is not a citizen, 
he will remain detained indefinitely. He may be an unsympathetic and 
unlikely person to use as the exemplar for an immigrants’ rights 
argument, but the very fact that he has offended public sensibilities 
encourages consideration of the foundation of constitutional 
protections—whether that foundation is a shared humanity or a 
particular legal status. 
Hernandez–Carrera’s conviction required that he be deported once 
he completed his prison term in 1993, but the United States and Cuba 
did not have an agreement under which he could be “removed.” The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“legacy INS”)4 continued to 
                                                                                                                 
1 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
2 Santos Hernandez–Carrera was one of over 125,000 Cubans allowed to enter the United 
States as part of the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. Brief for Appellees at 2, Hernandez–Carrera v. 
Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-3097). During a four month period in 1980, the 
Cuban government opened its port in Mariel, Cuba to American citizens to pick up their family 
members. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The 
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 56 (2002). 
3 Brief for Appellees, supra note 2, at 2.  
4 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was absorbed into the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) on March 1, 2003. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107–296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002). The DHS requested that “legacy INS” be used to 
refer to the agency prior to March 1, 2003, and “DHS” afterwards. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AILA PUBLICATIONS MANUAL OF STYLE 20 (2010), available at 
http://aila.org/Content/default.aspx?docid=22107. 
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detain him and over 3,000 other “non-removable” aliens5 until 2001 
when the landmark case, Zadvydas v. Davis,6 held that indefinite 
detention of lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”)7 raised serious 
constitutional questions.8 After this decision, legacy INS released 
over one thousand LPRs.9 While Hernandez–Carrera is not an LPR, 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) should have released 
him four years later when Clark v. Martinez10 extended the protection 
against indefinite detention to inadmissible aliens. Instead, the DHS 
determined that Hernandez–Carrera was “especially dangerous” and 
continued to hold him pursuant to a new regulation.11 That regulation, 
8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f), is the subject of this Note. 
When Zadvydas disallowed indefinite detention, legacy INS 
quickly promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)12 under which Hernandez–
Carrera is presently held. The regulation requires the indefinite 
detention of any alien if: (1) the alien committed a violent crime, 
(2) the alien suffers from mental illness, and (3) there is no condition 
of the alien’s release that can guarantee public safety.13 The 
regulation provides some procedural protections, but these protections 
fall well short of those afforded citizens. A line of Supreme Court 
decisions from 1972 to 1996 considered the substantive and 
procedural due process problems inherent in the civil commitment of 
                                                                                                                 
5 “Alien” is the legal term used to refer to any non-citizen in the United States. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006). 
6 533 U.S. 678 (2001). At the time, if a non-citizen’s home country had no extradition 
treaty with the United States, legacy INS could hold him indefinitely for an infraction as minor 
as overstaying a tourist visa. Id. at 691. In 2001, Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, Guyana, and Vietnam 
were among the nations to whom aliens could not be returned. Cindy Rodriguez, To Immigrant 
‘Lifers,’ Prison Release is Overdue, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2001, at B1. 
7 Immigrants who have not yet gained their citizenship can be classified in two groups: 
lawful permanent residents and “inadmissible aliens.” See infra Part I.A. Santos Hernandez-
Carrera was technically an “inadmissible alien” because by committing a crime, he violated a 
condition of his parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (providing that any alien who 
commits a "crime involving moral turpitude" is inadmissible). 
8 533 U.S. at 696. 
9 See Robert Charles Hill & Donald Kerwin, Immigration and Nationality Law, 36 INT’L 
LAW. 527, 534 n.68 (2002) (citing Caryl Clarke, Detainee Release Slowly Progresses, YORK 
DAILY REC., Sept. 3, 2001, at 3A). 
10 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
11 See Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (D. Kan. 2008), 
vacated, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that after Clark v. Martinez, the DHS 
reviewed Hernandez-Carrera’s detention and determined that continued detention was warranted 
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)). 
12 See Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433 (July 24, 2001) (ordering the 
development of new regulations “for aliens presenting special circumstances”); John S. 
Richbourg, Liberty and Security: The Yin and Yang of Immigration Law, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 
475, 492–93 (2003). 
13 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1) (2010). 
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mentally ill citizens.14 As a result, citizens convicted of even the most 
atrocious crimes cannot be held beyond their prison terms without 
considerable due process.15 If Hernandez–Carrera had been protected 
by the procedures required for citizens, he would almost certainly be 
free today.  
Hernandez–Carrera was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993,16 
and in the fifteen years since his DHS detention began, he received 
five psychiatric evaluations, each confirming that he had some form 
of mental illness. Only one found any predilection toward violence. 
The other evaluators found that his “insight was good . . . , [he had] 
adapted well to his incarceration,” and that “[t]here were no reports of 
disciplinary incidents [in over five years], and no indication of 
violence perpetrated against others while incarcerated.”17 The senior 
psychiatrist at the University of Kansas Medical Center found that 
Hernandez–Carrera’s mental health condition was unrelated to his 
crime. In June 2006, the government’s own psychiatrist 
recommended that he be released to a group home.18 Nevertheless, an 
Immigration Judge found that Hernandez–Carrera met the 
requirements of the DHS’s regulation, so the DHS could hold him 
indefinitely.19 Hernandez–Carrera successfully challenged his 
detention in federal district court,20 but the government won its appeal 
                                                                                                                 
14 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (holding an Indiana statute which 
allowed for indefinite detention for criminal defendants determined unfit to stand trail violated 
due process); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (holding that in order to 
commit a person to a mental institution in a civil commitment proceeding and still comport with 
procedural due process , the State must prove by a preponderance the evidence that the person is 
mentally ill); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–78 (1992) (holding that a Louisiana statute 
violated due process where it allowed for the indefinite commitment of a person acquitted on the 
basis of insanity if that person exhibited anti-social behavior, regardless of whether that person 
was still mentally ill); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (holding a Kansas statute 
that allowed for the civil commitment of anyone who had conditions that fell within the statute’s 
definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied due process); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 
407, 411–12 (2002) (holding that Hendricks does not require the State to prove complete lack of 
control of his or her behavior, but it does require the State to prove some degree of lack of 
control).  
15 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (holding that due process was met in the civil 
commitment of a man convicted seven times for the sexual abuse of dozens of pre-pubescent 
children). 
16  Brief for Appellees, supra note 2, at 3. Schizophrenia is a condition that places him at 
greater risk to be a victim of violence than to be a perpetrator of violence. Id. at 4. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 Id. at 4–5. 
19 Id. at 5 (“On February 10, 2006, an immigration judge issued a decision ordering 
Carrera's continued detention under federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 241.14.”).  
20 See Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1191 (D. Kan. 2008) 
(holding that Hernandez–Carrera was “entitled to release under appropriate conditions of 
supervision”), vacated, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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to the Tenth Circuit.21 In December 2009, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.22 As a result, Hernandez–Carrera remains in prison. 
Whether the DHS indefinite-detention regulation 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.14(f) can or should be overturned depends on the answers to 
several difficult questions. First, may the Supreme Court assert its 
authority and “say what the law is”23 with regard to the DHS 
regulation? If it may, does the DHS regulation offend substantive or 
procedural due process? If the DHS regulation satisfies due process, 
does it nevertheless violate equal protection principles?  
Constitutional questions that bear on the rights of immigrants are 
particularly problematic. The doctrine of plenary power has 
traditionally forestalled judicial review of the political branches’ 
immigration laws and regulations.24 When, as in Zadvydas, the 
Supreme Court has hinted at the existence of immigrants’ 
constitutional rights,25 it has done so almost entirely through statutory 
interpretation rather than a direct constitutional pronouncement.26 The 
different categories of aliens create an added dimension of 
uncertainty. The constitutionality of DHS’ indefinite-detention 
regulation is a very close question.  
This Note argues that though the Supreme Court is not compelled 
by its precedents to strike down the indefinite-detention regulation, it 
has ample latitude to, and should, do so. Absent Supreme Court 
action, Congress should seize the earliest opportunity to indicate to 
the DHS that the regulation is not authorized. 
                                                                                                                 
21 Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008) (vacating the 
district court's prior decision ordering the release of Hernandez–Carrera). 
22 Hernandez–Carrera v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) (mem.), denying cert. to 
547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). 
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
24 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990) (“The 
plenary power doctrine’s contours have changed over the years, but in general the doctrine 
declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority over 
immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion, 
entertain constitutional challenges to decisions about which aliens should be admitted or 
expelled.”).  
25 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (finding that “indefinite detention of 
[lawful permanent residents] would raise serious constitutional concerns” and invoking the 
canon of constitutional avoidance). 
26 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576–77 (2006) (avoiding Suspension 
Clause question by denying that Congress intended its revocation of statutory habeas to be 
retroactive); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (avoiding Suspension Clause question by 
finding that statutory habeas right was not rescinded); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 
(2003) (finding that where a statute’s provision is purported to bar habeas review, Supreme 
Court requires particularly clear statement that such is Congress’ intent); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (finding that a statute did not rescind judicial review of matters of law 
because to do so would pose constitutional questions). 
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Part I of this Note reviews the tradition of plenary power and the 
“entry fiction” doctrine by which earlier Courts upheld the denial of 
immigrants’ constitutional rights. It discusses Zadvydas’s narrowing 
of plenary power and the Supreme Court’s implicit recognition of 
LPRs’ substantive right to be free from indefinite detention.27  
Part II considers the parallel evolution of aliens’ rights to habeas 
corpus review. Two recent lines of Supreme Court cases upheld 
LPRs’ statutory right to judicial review in matters of law,28 and 
recognized all aliens’ constitutional right to habeas corpus 
protection.29 Equally importantly, these cases confirmed that plenary 
power does not preclude the Supreme Court from overturning 
unconstitutional immigration statutes. 
Part III reviews the due process issues posed by civil detention of 
persons considered dangerous to the community. Though the DHS 
regulation does not violate the substantive component of Fifth 
Amendment due process, its procedural protections fall well short of 
those provided by state and federal civil commitment statutes. Part III 
argues that Landon v. Plasencia30 exemplifies how the Supreme Court 
should use Mathews v. Eldridge31 to evaluate the DHS regulation’s 
procedural sufficiency. The Court may find the DHS regulation 
unconstitutional, but because the Court stopped short of a definitive 
ruling in Plasencia, such a finding is not compelled.  
Part IV shows that equal protection arguments will not be 
successful in challenging the DHS regulation, and Part V sets forth 
two policy reasons for the Supreme Court to complete the work it 
began in Plasencia and find the regulation unconstitutional or, in the 
                                                                                                                 
27 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (reading Zadvydas as possibly a 
radical shift in immigration law reasserting Supreme Court oversight of non-citizens’ 
constitutional protections).  
28 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 517 (refusing to recognize congressional intent to deny 
judicial review of questions of law and constitutionality); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (declining to 
recognize congressional intent to prohibit judicial review of important issues of law). 
29 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (holding that the Suspension 
Clause applies to enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576–84 
(holding that because Congress did not clearly intend law stripping federal courts of jurisdiction 
to hear habeas petitions to be retroactive, two enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay could 
file habeas petitions); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear 
challenges to the indefinite detention of enemy combatants by the Executive branch). 
30 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (considering what procedural protections are required when a lawful 
permanent resident faces deportation after forfeiting her lawful status by helping smuggle aliens 
into the country). 
31 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test to assess the sufficiency of 
procedural protections when a private interest will be affected by government action). 
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alternative, for Congress to clarify that DHS is not authorized to 
detain aliens indefinitely.  
I. PLENARY POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Introduction 
Before reviewing the Supreme Court’s evolving authority to 
review the constitutionality of immigration statutes, it is necessary to 
define several different categories of non-citizens. An “alien” is any 
person in the country who is “not a citizen or national of the United 
States.”32 Historically, the government has afforded different benefits 
and levels of constitutional protection to different categories of 
aliens.33 A discussion of plenary power and constitutional rights 
therefore requires a clear description of these categories. Two 
classifications are particularly important to the following discussion.34 
The first distinction is between immigrants who intend to stay in the 
country and create a life here, and nonimmigrants who do not intend 
to abandon their residence in a foreign country.35 This Note deals 
primarily with immigrants.  
Among immigrants there are two major categories: (1) lawful 
permanent residents (“LPR”)36 (immigrants who have been granted 
permission to live and work in the United States), and 
(2) inadmissible aliens (non-citizens who entered the country without 
authorization or who are otherwise ineligible to enter the country or 
remain).37 The government typically grants LPRs greater rights and 
privileges.38  
                                                                                                                 
32 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). 
33 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976) (finding that it is “unquestionably 
reasonable” for Congress to differentiate between non-citizens based on their immigration status 
and their duration in the country).  
34 There are a wide variety of ways to categorize non-citizens. See id. at 79 n.13. 
(describing the different classifications of aliens under American law). 
35 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (defining all non-immigrant 
categories). 
36 See id. § 1151 (describing the categories of non-citizens “who may . . . acquire the 
status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence”). 
37 See id. § 1182 (establishing health problems, criminal activity, national security and 
foreign policy concerns, labor competition, and others as bases for an alien’s inadmissibility). 
38 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 389 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]onstitutional questions raised by detaining inadmissible aliens are different from those 
raised by detaining admitted aliens.” (emphasis omitted)); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 
770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been 
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. 
Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him 
certain rights.”).  
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B. Plenary Power 
Before the Supreme Court explicitly examines the constitutionality 
of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f), the indefinite-detention regulation, it must 
decide if the doctrine of plenary power precludes such judicial 
review. Though the Court is far from unanimous, its recent decisions 
suggest that the plenary power doctrine does not bar constitutional 
review of the regulation. 
1. Roots of Plenary Power 
In immigration law, plenary power is a separation-of-powers 
doctrine under which courts have accorded to the political branches 
almost absolute deference when the federal government legislates or 
acts to deport or exclude an alien.39 The application of this doctrine to 
immigration law has its roots in the anti-Chinese sentiments that 
swept California in the 1880’s.40 After twelve years of lawful 
residence in the San Francisco area, Chae Chan Ping obtained a 
reentry permit and set off by steam ship to visit his family in China.41 
During his absence, Congress reacted to the Chinese “menace to our 
civilization” by passing a law that, among other provisions, denied 
reentry to returning Chinese residents even if they had obtained 
proper permits.42 After he was denied reentry in 1888, Chae Chan 
Ping challenged the law, asserting vested rights, contractual rights, 
and constitutional protections.43 The Supreme Court held that the 
government had sovereign, constitutionally unrestrained plenary 
power to exclude any non-citizen; therefore, Chae Chan had no such 
rights or protections.44 
                                                                                                                 
39 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1889) (holding that 
Congress has plenary power, even in times of peace, to exclude aliens from or to prevent their 
return to the United States for any reason).  
40 Id. at 595. 
41 Id. at 582. 
42 Id. at 595. 
43 DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 16 
(2007). 
44 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (“The government, possessing the powers which 
are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the 
occasion on which the powers shall be called forth ; and its determination, so far as the subjects 
affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. . . . In 
both [times of war and peace, the government’s determination of the necessity of exclusion] is 
conclusive upon the judiciary.”); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights 
Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity? 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 231 (2007). (“[T]he 
Court rejected all of the doctrinal categories . . . including contractual rights, vested rights, 
constitutional protections, and limited governmental powers.”). 
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Shortly thereafter, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,45 a divided 
Court held that Congress’ unrestrained immigration power included 
the power to deport immigrants already living in the United States. 
Cited by Supreme Court majorities more than seventy times,46 this 
case became the foundation for immigration jurisprudence. Under 
Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, the doctrine of plenary power 
asserted that the political branches should be unfettered by Supreme 
Court review when they act to keep immigrants from entering the 
country—called exclusion—and when they act to deport them—
called removal. 
2. Early Limitations on Plenary Power 
Early on, the Supreme Court recognized some limitations to the 
government’s power regarding immigrants. In 1896, it acknowledged 
aliens’ due process protections in federal criminal proceedings,47 and 
in 1915, the Court held that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
bars states from curtailing aliens’ economic opportunities.48 Initially, 
these rights applied to the lives of immigrants in the United States, 
but the rights did not limit government power over the processes of 
immigration or deportation.  
In Yamataya v. Fisher,49 however, the Court identified such a limit 
to government power. Yamataya involved an inadmissible Japanese 
woman who, within two weeks of arrival in Seattle, was the subject of 
a warrant for “surreptitiously, clandestinely, unlawfully and without 
any authority, com[ing] into the United States . . . .”50 The Court 
insisted that it is a violation of due process to detain and deport 
without a hearing even a non-citizen who was unlawfully and briefly 
                                                                                                                 
45 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or deport [non-citizens] . . . is 
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country”). 
Ironically, the author of the Chae Chan Ping opinion, Justice Field, penned the most passionate 
dissent. Id. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting) (“As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible 
deportation from a country of one's residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of 
friendship, family and business there contracted.”). 
46 Kanstroom, supra note 44, at 231. 
47 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that a federal statute 
that punished non-citizens with hard-labor for up to one year without a judicial trial for the 
crime of being in the country illegally was unconstitutional). 
48 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (finding an equal protection violation in an Arizona 
law requiring establishments with five employees or more to have a staff consisting of at least 
80% native born citizens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation where a San Francisco ordinance requiring laundries in wooden buildings 
to get a permit resulted in no Chinese persons being issued a permit while virtually every white 
applicant was issued one). 
49 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
50 Id. at 87.  
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present in the United States.51 Though Yamataya is still cited today 
for its limitation on congressional power in deportation proceedings,52 
its scope was significantly curtailed with the advent of the “entry 
fiction” doctrine.53 
3. Entry Fiction—The Extreme of Plenary Power 
Under the entry fiction doctrine, courts consider inadmissible 
aliens to be “outside of the country for constitutional purposes.”54 In 
Yamataya, the Court held that a woman “unlawfully” in the United 
States was nevertheless entitled to due process protections. Yet, in the 
early 1950s, two national security cases effectively ignored Yamataya 
and introduced a new doctrine. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy,55 the government detained the wife of an honorably 
discharged American soldier when she tried to enter the country. 
After holding her for two months on Ellis Island, the Attorney 
General denied her admission to the United States without any 
process or explanation. When she challenged her exclusion in habeas 
corpus proceedings, the federal courts denied her writ and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that aliens had significantly restricted 
due process rights.56 Though the Court devoted most of its brief 
opinion to the political branches’ national security powers, the Knauff 
opinion is most quoted for its broadly sweeping dicta that “[w]hatever 
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
                                                                                                                 
51 The Court found that the Secretary of the Treasury necessarily erred in interpreting the 
congressional statute to allow deportation without giving the alien a chance to be heard. Id. at 
101. “No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are 
recognized. This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here in question, and 
they need not be otherwise interpreted.” Id.  
52 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens 
to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01)). 
53 See Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 391 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This paradox of 
paroling aliens into the United States yet refusing to recognize their ‘entry’ into the United 
States has been termed the ‘entry fiction’ by some courts.”). 
54 Aaron Greene Leiderman, Agency Polymorphism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 781, 783 n.3 
(2009) (citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925)). 
55 338 U.S. 537 (1950). On August 14, 1948, Knauff sought to enter the United States to 
be naturalized but was detained at Ellis Island until October 6, 1948 at which time the Supreme 
Court entered a final order of exclusion “without a hearing on the ground that her admission 
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Id. at 539–40. 
56 Id. at 543 (“Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the 
United States. But because the power of exclusion of aliens is also inherent in the executive 
department of the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise 
the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best interests of the country during a time of national 
emergency. Executive officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the procedures for 
carrying out the congressional intent.”).  
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alien denied entry is concerned.”57 The entry fiction doctrine was 
significantly extended in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,58 
when the Court denied both substantive and procedural due process to 
a man facing indefinite detention.  
Mezei was a lawful, gainfully employed resident of the United 
States for over twenty years until 1948 when he left to visit his dying 
mother in Romania. Romania denied him entry, and Hungary, 
through which he was travelling, denied him an exit permit for 
nineteen months. When he finally returned to the United States, 
legacy INS detained him at Ellis Island. Legacy INS refused to 
divulge the national security concerns upon which it based his 
incarceration,59 and it continued to hold Mezei when it found that no 
country was willing to take him. Over a “vigorous dissent”60 by 
Justices Black, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Douglas, Justice Clark 
wrote for the majority that because Mezei was not legally in the 
United States, his indefinite detention violated no constitutional 
right.61 Although Justice Clark’s opinion emphasized the importance 
of the national security concerns, the denial of constitutional 
protections to aliens requesting entry was soon expanded to 
inadmissible aliens already present in the United States who posed no 
national security risk.  
In Leng May Ma v. Barber,62 a woman fleeing from persecution in 
China arrived in the United States and claimed citizenship on the 
ground that her father was a United States citizen. The government 
detained her for fifteen months and then paroled her into the country 
pending the review of her claim. Failing in her assertion of derived 
citizenship, she sought protection from persecution back in China by 
requesting asylum. At the time, asylum was available only to aliens 
“within the United States,”63 and the Court determined that as a 
parolee, she was not in the United States. “She was still in theory of 
law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United 
States.”64 The advent of the entry fiction doctrine was thus the low 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. at 544. Knauff denied the procedural due process required by Yamataya perhaps 
because Knauff dealt with a woman who had never lived in the United States and who could be 
returned to her home country. Knauff recognized Yamataya with no more than a “cf.” citation. 
Id. at 543. 
58 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
59 Id. at 209. 
60 Motomura, supra note 24, at 558. 
61 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214–15 (“[T]he Attorney General may lawfully exclude respondent 
without a hearing . . . . [H]e is treated as if stopped at the border.”). 
62 357 U.S. 185 (1958). 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).  
64 Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 189 (quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) 
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watermark for the Court’s recognition of aliens’ constitutional 
rights.65 Apparently, aliens had none. 
B. Narrowing Plenary Power  
The entry fiction is still a living part of the “plenary power 
edifice,”66 but the Supreme Court has narrowed its scope.67 In Landon 
v. Plasencia,68 an LPR who had lived in the United States for five 
years spent several days in Mexico. While returning, legacy INS 
caught her helping several aliens make an unlawful entry into the 
United States.69 Because of the nefarious purpose of her excursion 
from the country, the Supreme Court held that she had relinquished 
the statutory protections normally accorded to an LPR in a 
deportation hearing. Nevertheless, the Court held that since she had 
made a previous lawful entry as a permanent resident she was entitled 
to due process before being excluded.70  
This holding had two implications for plenary power. First, the 
Court held that a lawful permanent resident did not necessarily lose 
her due process protections upon reentry to the country after a brief 
absence.71 Plasencia, therefore, arguably limited the entry fiction to 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Holmes, J.)). As in Mezei, Leng May Ma commanded only a five-justice majority. The four 
dissenting justices objected particularly to the application of the entry fiction to deny protection 
from persecution. Id. at 192 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“This alien is not in custody at our border. 
She is here on parole. . . . How an alien can be paroled ‘into the United States' and yet not be 
‘within the United States' remains a mystery.”). 
65 Though one may speculate that the 5-4 Mezei decision may have turned on the national 
security issue, by 2001 many courts generalized the holding. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 693 (2001); see also, Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial 
Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1025–26 (2007) 
(interpreting the Mezei decision as “uncompromising” and clearly defining the scope of the 
entry fiction). 
66 Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 374. 
67 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1025–26 (“[T]he [entry fiction] doctrine is not as 
absolute as it might have once seemed. In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court indicated that a long-
term resident alien had due process rights even though she had been stopped at the border after a 
brief stay outside of the country.” (footnote omitted)); see also Richbourg, supra note 12, at 494 
(complaining that Zadvydas rejected the government argument that since Zadvydas’ conviction 
made him inadmissible, he was outside the border and without constitutional protections). 
68 459 U.S. 21 (1982).  
69 Id. at 23. As an LPR, Plasencia requested that her removal be litigated in deportation 
proceedings where she would be afforded greater procedural protections. Id. at 26.  
70 Id. at 35 (“[T]he courts must evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what 
procedures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of a 
permanent resident alien.”). 
71 Prior to the redefinition of “entry” and “admission” in 1996, whether a lawful 
permanent resident retained her right to reenter the United States depended on whether her trip 
was more than “an innocent, casual, and brief excursion.” Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 
462 (1963). In 1996, Congress codified the Court’s holdings when it defined the new concept of 
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immigrants who had not yet made a lawful entry.72 Second, and 
equally important, Plasencia emphasized that its holding was 
constitutional and not just statutory.73 This signaled the possibility 
that the Supreme Court might be willing to limit plenary power 
deference where sufficiently compelling constitutional rights were at 
stake. It took almost twenty years, however, for it to do so. 
C. Zadvydas v. Davis and Its Progeny 
In 2001, Zadvydas v. Davis confirmed that Congress’ power to 
regulate immigrants is constitutionally limited and that the Supreme 
Court would assert its authority to enforce those limits.74 Kestutis 
Zadvydas, a lawful permanent resident born to Lithuanian parents in a 
German displaced persons camp, was ordered removed from the 
United States due to his criminal activity.75 Neither Lithuania nor 
Germany would accept him, and it became clear that his detention 
would be indefinite.76 Legacy INS justified the detention as a 
                                                                                                                 
 
“admission.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2006) (setting forth the statutory requirements for 
lawful admission).  
72 Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 374 (“Mezei was read [by Plasencia] to apply only to 
initial entrants . . . .”). 
73 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 329–30. To justify its recognition of due process rights in an 
alien who had previously entered the country lawfully, Plasencia relied on Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), which had recognized such a right in a lawful permanent resident 
who, prior to leaving for several months as a maritime sailor, had obtained immigration papers 
to allow him to reenter. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 31 n.7. The Mezei majority cited but then ignored 
Chew v. Colding’s holding when it concluded that “the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain 
unaltered whether he has been here once before or not.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953). Plasencia effectively resuscitated Chew v. Colding by 
affirming the constitutional foundations of its holding. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 33 (“Although the 
[Chew v. Colding] holding was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of 
constitutional law. Any doubts that Chew recognized constitutional rights in the resident alien 
returning from a brief trip abroad were dispelled by Rosenberg v. Fleuti, where we described 
Chew as holding ‘that the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a 
hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him.’” (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 
374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963))). 
74 See Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. And Mexican Law: 
Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1345, 1348 (2007) (“[I]n 2001, contrary to a century of precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Zadvydas v. Davis explicitly stated that plenary power over immigration is ‘subject to important 
constitutional limitations.’”); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 366 (by subjecting Congress’ 
immigration power “to important constitutional limitations” Zadvydas “may represent a radical 
shift, a turning point for immigration law no less important than Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp 
v. Ohio for criminal procedure, Baker v. Carr for equal protection, and Goldberg v. Kelly for 
due process.” (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696)).  
75 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678. 
76 The second case consolidated in the Zadvydas decision was that of a Cambodian, Kim 
Ho Ma, who at the age of 17 was involved in a gang-related shooting, convicted of 
manslaughter, and served two years of a 38-month sentence before being released into legacy 
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permissible reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provided that an 
“alien ordered removed who . . . has been determined by the Attorney 
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the 
order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period.”77 A 5-
4 Court ruled that because Zadvydas was a lawful permanent resident, 
legacy INS could not hold him indefinitely.78  
The Court framed its decision as one of statutory interpretation, 
relying on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.79 The Court 
explained that, “[b]ased on [its] conclusion that indefinite detention 
. . . would raise serious constitutional concerns,” it was limiting post-
removal-order detention to six months.80 Zadvydas included an 
extensive analysis of its “serious constitutional concern,” citing 
frequently the Court’s line of cases circumscribing the power of the 
government to hold someone deemed dangerous to society in a non-
criminal context.81 Dissenting, Justice Kennedy (joined by the Chief 
                                                                                                                 
 
INS custody. 533 U.S. at 685.  
77 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). The Section specifies four categories of 
aliens to whom the extended removal period applies: (1) aliens who are inadmissible, and aliens 
who are deportable because (2) they violated their immigration status, (3) they committed a 
crime, or (4) they pose a national security threat. Id. 
78 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679 (holding that the detention statute implicitly limits an alien’s 
detention “to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United 
States”). The constitutionality of indefinite detention of post-removal-order aliens had been 
questioned before. In 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected indefinite detention 
proposed in the House version of the Immigration and Nationality Act because it “present[ed] a 
constitutional question.” Martin, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting S. Rep. No. 2239 (1950)). 
Congress ultimately authorized legacy INS to hold aliens for six months while arrangements 
were made for removal. Thereafter, the bill provided for supervised release. Id.  
79 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679 (adhering to the general rule that if there are two equally 
plausible interpretations of an ambiguous statute and one of the two poses constitutional 
questions, then the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that the court assume that 
Congress intended the other one); id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that where a 
court finds “two interpretations of equal plausibility, it should choose the construction that 
avoids confronting a constitutional question.”). 
80 Id. at 682. The Court limited to six months the presumptively reasonable time period 
during which an alien can be held following the alien’s final removal order. Id. at 701. 
81 Id. at 690–702. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39 (1972) (holding that, 
prior to indefinite civil detention, full due process rights were due to a criminal defendant 
unable to stand trial due to incompetence); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) 
(upholding pre-trial detention only for “the most serious of crimes” and only with “stringent 
time limitations” and other judicial safeguards); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(holding that since “[f]reedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause,” the state may confine someone only if it shows by clear 
and convincing evidence that he is both mentally ill and dangerous); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (finding no due process or double jeopardy violation where a sexual 
predator had access to court-appointed counsel, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and 
other protections prior to post-sentence civil commitment, which included rehabilitation 
services). The DHS focused particularly on the Hendricks dicta, which allowed that a “finding 
of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify 
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Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) opined that an alien had no 
substantive rights and was due no procedural protections, so there 
were no constitutional questions to avoid.82 Nevertheless, the majority 
recognized both substantive and procedural rights. As summarized by 
Justice Souter, “The Zadvydas opinion opened by noting the clear 
applicability of general due process standards: physical detention 
requires both a ‘special justification’ that ‘outweighs the individual's 
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint’ and 
‘adequate procedural protections.’”83  
While framing a decision as statutory interpretation rather than a 
constitutional pronouncement shows judicial deference to 
congressional authority, Zadvydas was noteworthy for its limitation 
on Congress’s plenary power.84 Justice Breyer explicitly emphasized 
that plenary power “is subject to important constitutional 
limitations. . . . Congress must choose ‘a constitutionally permissible 
means of implementing’ that power . . . .”85 The Supreme Court 
showed that it was prepared to go beyond merely reminding Congress 
of its duty to respect Constitutional boundaries.86 Both in Zadvydas 
and Plasencia, the Court’s rulings indicated that judicial restraint in 
immigration was not absolute, and that it would step in and enforce 
constitutional boundaries if Congress overstepped them. In Plasencia, 
the Court insisted on procedural due process for an LPR being denied 
reentry to the United States, and in Zadvydas, the Court disallowed 
indefinite detention of LPRs.  
While Zadvydas limited plenary power and recognized the rights 
of LPRs, it left open three important questions. First, did the 
prohibition of indefinite detention extend beyond LPRs to 
                                                                                                                 
 
indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they 
have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental 
illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’” Id. at 358.  
82 Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Whether a due process right is 
denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or dangers to the community are detained 
turns, then, not on the substantive right to be free, but on whether there are adequate procedures 
to review their cases . . . .”).  
83 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. at 690). 
84 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Any supposed respect the 
Court seeks in not reaching the constitutional question is outweighed by the intrusive and 
erroneous exercise of its own powers. In the guise of judicial restraint the Court ought not to 
intrude upon the other branches.”).  
85 Id. at 695 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983)). 
86 See Martin, supra note 2, at 71 n.64 (“For the critics the crucial issue is not whether the 
Constitution controls, but whether the courts would play any role in holding the executive and 
Congress to such limitations.”).  
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inadmissible aliens as well? In Zadvydas, the government argued that 
indefinite detention of all aliens was permissible under Mezei.87 The 
Court could have ruled that Mezei was not controlling because 
national security was a dominant concern in that case and not in 
Zadvydas. The Supreme Court instead distinguished between 
Zadvyas’ LPR status and Mezei’s inadmissible status.88 This 
distinction suggested that indefinite detention might still be possible 
for inadmissible immigrants like Mezei.89 Second, would the Court 
explicitly recognize due process rights, either substantive or 
procedural, in cases where aliens were detained temporarily? 
Especially if indefinite detention is impermissible, there may be a 
term of detention that is per se too long or that requires a minimum of 
procedural protections. Third, could legacy INS continue to 
indefinitely detain non-removable LPRs whom the agency deemed 
dangerous to society? After Zadvydas, federal appellate courts 
reached opposite conclusions as to whether an alien posing a danger 
to society may be indefinitely detained, regardless of the required 
procedural protections.   
1. Indefinite Detention for Inadmissible Aliens 
After Zadvydas, the circuits split as to whether Zadvydas six-
month, post-removal limit on detention also applied to inadmissible 
aliens. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits held that it did,90 while the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits upheld legacy INS’s authority to hold 
such aliens indefinitely.91 Significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s en banc 
decision in Rosales–Garcia v. Holland explicitly repudiated the entry 
fiction doctrine and rejected Mezei as controlling precedent.92 The 
                                                                                                                 
87 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. 
88 Id. at 693 (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United 
States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”). 
89 The language that caused the most difficulty was Justice Breyer’s comment: “We deal 
here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. 
Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different 
question.” Id. at 682. 
90 See Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that 
alien detention statute implicitly carries a reasonable time limitation); Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832 
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, due to the Zadvydas decision, legacy INS must limit an alien’s 
detention period to a reasonable time). 
91 See Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Zadvydas 
decision did not apply where the alien was not admitted to the United States); Benitez v. Wallis, 
337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that detention of an inadmissible alien did not violate 
due process), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
92 Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14 (reasoning that the Mezei decision was “explicitly 
grounded . . . in the special circumstances of a national emergency” and the Attorney General’s 
conclusion that Mezei was “a threat to national security”). 
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Sixth Circuit concluded that an inadmissible alien must have 
constitutional protections:  
If [inadmissible] aliens were not protected by even the 
substantive component of constitutional due process . . . we 
do not see why the United States government could not 
torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not 
believe that our Constitution could permit persons living in 
the United States . . . to be subjected to any government 
action without limit, we conclude that government treatment 
of [inadmissible] aliens must implicate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.93 
The Rosales–Garcia court also considered the statutory question 
of whether Congress could have intended a different meaning for 
inadmissible aliens than it did for lawful permanent residents. In 
section 1231(a)(6), the text drew no distinction between LPRs and 
inadmissible aliens in the subject of the sentence. “An alien ordered 
removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 [or] removable 
under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) [referring to 
LPRs] . . . may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .”94 The 
Rosales–Garcia court joined the Ninth Circuit in concluding that it 
was implausible that Congress could have intended that legacy INS 
could hold one group indefinitely but not the other.95  
Because the Supreme Court agreed with this latter argument, it did 
not reach the constitutional question.96 Writing for a 7-2 majority in 
Clark v. Martinez, Justice Scalia sidestepped any constitutional 
consideration and simply explained that the language of the statute at 
the center of attention in Zadvydas allowed for no distinction between 
lawful permanent residents and inadmissible aliens.97 By restricting 
                                                                                                                 
93 Id. at 410. 
94 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). 
95 Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 408 (“[W]e can find no sound reason to interpret and 
apply the statute one way for one category of aliens, but a different way for others.” (quoting 
Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042 (D. Minn. 2001))). Justice Scalia suggested the 
same argument in his Zadvydas dissent. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 704–05 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Leiderman, supra note 54, at 784–85 (comparing this “lowest 
common denominator” approach or “unitarianism” with agency “polymorphism” under which 
an agency may interpret a statute differently in different situations). 
96 The Supreme Court faced a split among the circuits and the real possibility that the 
DHS would transfer detainees out of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits to hold them indefinitely. 
Rosales–Garcia, 322 F.3d at 418 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
97 543 U.S. 371, 378 (“To give these same words a different meaning for each category 
would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”). 
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his opinion to statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia avoided 
suggesting that inadmissible aliens had constitutional protections. 
2. Temporary Detention of Aliens 
Though Zadvydas arguably recognized a substantive due process 
right for LPRs to be free from indefinite detention, it gave no 
indication whether temporary pre-removal-order detention might also 
pose constitutional problems.98 In Demore v. Kim, the Court 
addressed this issue and considered whether the Fifth Amendment 
was offended when an LPR, who had completed his criminal sentence 
six months earlier, was still being held pending his removal hearing.99 
Though the DHS held him without bail or a process to determine if he 
was a danger to society or a flight risk,100 the Court found no due 
process violation.101 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 
distinguished Zadvydas in two ways. First, in Zadvydas the detention 
was “‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’” whereas Kim’s pre-
hearing detention was “of a much shorter duration.”102 Second, the 
detention in Zadvydas was outside the scope of plenary power 
because removal was no longer possible, whereas the pre-hearing 
detention in Demore v. Kim was part of the removal process.103 This 
distinction suggested that plenary power may continue to have force 
when the government acts within the narrow confines of exclusion 
and removal.104 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, implied that even within 
those narrow confines, an LPR’s right to liberty might trump the 
government’s need for expediency when detention becomes 
prolonged. “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as 
respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to 
his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 
                                                                                                                 
98 After an alien convicted of a crime has completed a prison term, he is turned over to the 
DHS. He is held in detention waiting for a hearing to determine if he is removable. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) (2006) (defining the Attorney General’s detention and release authority). 
99 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Kim had been convicted of burglary and petty 
theft. Id. at 513. 
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien 
who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed [a specified criminal offense].”). 
101Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally 
permissible part of that process.”). 
102 Id. at 528 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S., at 690–91). 
103 Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28 (discussing how the pre-removal detention serves the 
purpose of assuring that deportable aliens will be available for hearing and thus actually 
removed if determined removable.). 
104 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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unreasonable or unjustified.”105 Though Justice Kennedy gave no 
indication when detention would become “unreasonable or 
unjustified,” he left the door open for a future Court to consider when 
extended detention might become unconstitutional. As in Zadvydas, 
he denied that aliens have substantive due process rights, but he 
reminded his fellow justices that aliens may still be entitled to 
procedural protections, even for detention that was not open-ended.106 
When the Supreme Court found itself divided over the rights of 
Guantanamo detainees three times in the next five years, Kennedy’s 
viewpoint would determine the Court’s ruling: aliens have a right to 
procedural due process when detention becomes prolonged.107 
3. Indefinite Detention of Aliens Under “Special Circumstances” 
The Zadvydas majority recognized an LPR’s substantive liberty 
interest to be free from “an indefinite term of imprisonment,”108 but it 
acknowledged that special arguments might be made for “terrorism or 
other special circumstances.”109 When crafting its indefinite- 
detention regulation, legacy INS seized upon this language to limit 
the reach of Zadvydas. The agency grafted the reference to “special 
circumstances” to the majority opinion’s entirely unrelated reference 
to civil detention cases.110 The result was a regime of continued 
detention for any alien determined to be “specially dangerous.”111 
This designation would attach to any alien who satisfied three criteria: 
(1) he committed a violent crime; (2) he was likely to engage in future 
acts of violence due to a mental condition; and (3) for him there was 
                                                                                                                 
105 Denmore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
106 “Whether a due process right is denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or 
dangers to the community are detained turns, then, not on the substantive right to be free, but on 
whether there are adequate procedures to review their cases . . . .” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
107 See infra Part II.C. 
108 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. 
109 Id. at 696.  
110 Zadvydas cited the Hendricks line of cases to support its conclusion that indefinite 
detention poses serious constitutional questions. Id. at 690. Later in the decision, the Court 
explained that its prohibition of indefinite detention did not extend to “terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of 
national security.” Id. at 696 (emphasis added). That the Court used the phrase “special 
circumstances” in both sections of its opinion apparently provided legacy INS a plausible, 
though disingenuous, connection. 
111 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010). Section 241.14 also permits indefinite detention of an alien 
“with a highly contagious disease that is a threat to public safety,” aliens “detained on account 
of serious adverse foreign policy consequences of release,” and aliens “detained on account of 
security or terrorism concerns.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(b)–(d). 
 1/11/2011 12:43:10 PM 
2011] ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION 19 
no condition of release that could reasonably ensure public safety.112 
Legacy INS included some procedural protections in the regulation,113 
but these protections were significantly inferior to those required for 
citizens facing long-term civil commitment.114 The circuit courts 
ultimately split on whether the DHS’s indefinite-detention regulation 
was authorized after Zadvydas limited detention to a maximum time 
period of six months. 
In 2004, in Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft,115 the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the Supreme Court had not authorized indefinite detention except 
for reasons of national security. The court ruled that even “[a]n 
alien’s ill mental health coupled with dangerousness cannot justify 
indefinite detention under Zadvydas.”116 The Fifth Circuit reached the 
same conclusion in Tran v. Mukasey.117 Tran found that the 
government’s justification for detention was based upon the faulty 
premise that Zadvydas allowed an exception to its general prohibition 
from indefinite detention for aliens with “harm-threatening mental 
illness.”118 The Tran court read Clark v. Martinez as explicitly 
rejecting a different reading of section 1231(a)(6) for any subcategory 
of aliens.119  
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. In Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson,120 
the Tenth Circuit held that the DHS has the authority to detain an 
alien indefinitely if the agency determines that the alien “poses a 
special danger.”121 It argued that under National Cable & 
                                                                                                                 
112 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii).  
113 The new regulation required an administrative hearing at which the detainee, with the 
help of a court-provided interpreter, would have a chance to examine evidence against him, to 
cross-examine the government’s expert witness, and to bring a witness of his own. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.14(g)(3). However, he would have no right to an attorney, no right to an expert witness of 
his own, and no right to an interpreter to help review evidence and prepare a defense in advance 
of the hearing. Id. 
114 See infra Part III.B.2. 
115 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004). 
116 Id. at 798. The court found that in drafting 8 C.F.R. § 241.14, the Attorney General took 
the following Zadvydas dicta out of context: “certain special and narrow nonpunitive 
circumstances” such as a harm-threatening mental illness, may outweigh “the alien's 
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Id. at 794. The Zadvydas 
majority language taken in context “was intended to illustrate what the Government is generally 
prohibited from doing . . . .” Id. at 795 (“[D]espite the Government's contentions to the contrary, 
the reference in Zadvydas to special justifications and harm-threatening mental illnesses was not 
a statement of what § 1231(a)(6) authorizes. It was instead, an explanation of why the Court felt 
it was necessary to construe the statute narrowly.”). 
117 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008). 
118 Id. at 483. 
119 Id. at 482 (requiring the uniform application of § 1231(a)(6) to all aliens covered by the 
statute). 
120 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). 
121 Id. at 1253.  
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Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,122 Zadvydas 
was not dispositive as to the DHS’s post-Zadvydas interpretation of 
the detention statute. Brand X held that a “prior judicial construction 
of a statute trumps [a subsequent] agency construction . . . only if the 
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.”123 Since Zadvydas and Martinez “explicitly found the 
statute to be ambiguous as to whether and under what circumstances 
Congress authorized the Attorney General to detain aliens 
indefinitely,”124 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the court should 
defer to the DHS both as to the length of time an alien may be 
detained and as to the possibility of indefinite detention.125  
The DHS is within its authority to hold an alien indefinitely, so 
long as the regulation satisfies procedural due process and contains 
sufficient substantive limitations to indefinite detention.126 The court 
found that both conditions were satisfied. Unlike the original DHS 
regulation struck down by Zadvydas, the new DHS regulation was 
limited to “a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals.”127 
Moreover, the evidentiary burden required by the new regulations for 
a finding of “particularly dangerous” provided sufficient procedural 
protections.128 In December 2009, the Supreme Court denied 
Hernandez–Carrera’s petition for certiorari,129 and the circuit split 
remains.  
D. Current Status of Plenary Power and Substantive Alien Rights 
When Zadvydas explicitly limited the political branches’ action in 
immigration, there was some speculation that it signaled an end to 
plenary power—that the Supreme Court would no longer defer to the 
political branches in their regulation of immigrants.130 Demore v. Kim 
                                                                                                                 
122 545 U.S. 967 (2005). Prior to Brand X, it had been well-established under Chevron that 
when a statute administered by an agency “is silent or ambiguous” on an issue, courts owe that 
agency deference if the agency’s reading is a “permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Brand X clarified that 
even when a federal court construed the statute before the agency did, the courts still owed 
deference to the agency if the agency’s construction was permissible. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. 
123 Hernandez–Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244 (alteration in original) (quoting Brand X, 545 
U.S. at 982). 
124 Id. at 1245. 
125 Id. at 1256 (deferring to the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1236(a)(6)). 
126 Id. at 1251. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1252. 
129 Hernandez–Carrera v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1011, 1011–12 (2009) (mem.). 
130 See Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 366 (conjecturing that Zadvydas might represent a 
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reaffirmed that the Court would exercise discretion in reviewing 
immigration law, especially where the political branches acted within 
the narrow scope of exclusion and deportation. Justice Kennedy’s 
fifth-vote concurrence suggested, however, that deference to the 
political branches might not be absolute even within that narrow 
scope if constitutional boundaries were overstepped. 
The location of those constitutional boundaries is still unclear. 
Zadvydas identified a substantive liberty right of LPRs to be free from 
indefinite detention. With Justice O’Connor, the fifth-vote in 
Zadvydas, having retired, Justice Kennedy’s opinion takes on added 
meaning. He made clear both in Zadvydas and Demore that while he 
recognized no alien’s substantive right to liberty, he did recognize 
procedural guarantees even for inadmissible aliens.  
The Supreme Court’s decision to deny a writ of certiorari to 
Hernandez–Carrera could indicate that the Court agrees with the 
Tenth Circuit and will not expand Zadvydas, or it could simply mean 
that the facts of the case did not provide a suitable opportunity to 
invalidate the DHS’s indefinite-detention statute.131 The Supreme 
Court’s recent line of alien habeas corpus cases demonstrate that the 
plenary power doctrine no longer prevents the Court from directly 
challenging the political branches when they withhold aliens’ 
constitutional protections.  
II. HABEAS RIGHTS—THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE132  
APPLIES TO ALIENS 
From 2001 through 2008, while Zadvydas and its progeny were 
narrowing the plenary power doctrine and suggesting the existence of 
aliens’ substantive liberty interests, the Court wrestled with the 
question of whether aliens had a constitutional right to habeas 
corpus.133 During the same term as Zadvydas, the Supreme Court used 
                                                                                                                 
 
“radical shift” in immigration law). 
131  See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 907 n.5 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Denials of certiorari never have precedential value . . . .”). However, in Hernandez–Carrera, 
the Tenth Circuit hinted that lawful permanent residents might be entitled to greater procedural 
due process than inadmissible aliens, and it noted that Hernandez-Carrera had access to pro 
bono counsel and his own expert testimony. 547 F.3d at 1255–56. Implicitly, a pro se LPR 
would have a much stronger constitutional claim. 
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).  
133 A writ of habeas corpus is the order under which a person may challenge the legal 
authority under which the person is being detained. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 
2009). The authority of federal courts to consider such a challenge is codified by federal statute. 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). Since on its face the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from 
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the constitutional avoidance doctrine to tentatively assert LPRs’ right 
to judicial review of matters of law.134 It used constitutional 
avoidance twice more to protect the habeas rights of “enemy 
combatants” imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. When no longer able to 
avoid confronting the question directly, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the Suspension Clause applies to such aliens.135 Enemy combatants 
are a class of “inadmissible aliens,”136 and the Court’s rationale for 
granting them this constitutional right may apply to inadmissible 
aliens as a whole.  
A. Lawful Residents’ Right to Judicial Review  
of Questions of Law 
With the 1996 enactments of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”), Congress tried to 
eliminate judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas 
corpus statute.137 The Supreme Court, however, held in Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr that the federal courts’ power to 
review pure questions of law was undisturbed by either the AEDPA 
or the IIRAIRA.138 In St. Cyr, legacy INS challenged an LPR’s right 
to judicial review of his deportation proceeding following a 
controlled-substance conviction.139 Though four dissenting justices 
found no ambiguity in Congress’ intent to eliminate statutory habeas 
                                                                                                                 
 
suspending such a right, when Congress unambiguously amended the habeas statute to limit 
judicial authority to review aliens’ detention, the Supreme Court was forced to consider whether 
the Suspension Clause gave aliens a constitutional right to a writ of habeas corpus. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243–44 (2008). 
134 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311–14 (2001) (holding that LPRs were not deprived 
of their right to judicial review of questions of law). 
135 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2247 (“The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a 
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during 
periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain 
the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”) (internal 
quotation omitted); see also infra Part II.C. 
136 Since members of organizations which the United States government has designated as 
“terrorist” and other persons who threaten national security are considered inadmissible aliens 
under the immigration statute, Guantanamo detainees are “inadmissible aliens.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (2006) (“Any alien who . . . is a member of a terrorist organization . . . 
is inadmissible.”). 
137 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). “[P]rotecting the Executive's discretion from the courts 
. . . can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).  
138 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
139 Id. at 289.  
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corpus and insisted that this intent be respected,140 the majority held 
that to “preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would 
give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”141 Since the LPR 
framed his question as one of law, he was entitled to judicial review. 
Two years later, in Demore v. Kim,142 six justices confirmed that 
detained LPRs have a right to judicial review of matters of law. 
Legacy INS interpreted section 1226(e) as revoking judicial review of 
its bond and parole decisions. The statute stated: 
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the 
application of this [pre-hearing detention] section shall not be 
subject to review. No court may set aside any action or 
decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding 
the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, 
or denial of bond or parole.143 
Chief Justice Rehnquist recited for the majority the doctrine that the 
intent to revoke judicial review must be clear.144 He asserted that the 
statute “contains no explicit provision barring habeas review” of non-
discretionary decisions.145 Since the detained LPR challenged the 
statute’s constitutionality, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction. 
Justice O’Connor disagreed. She read the statute as unambiguously 
rescinding judicial review of all legacy INS decisions.146 Based on her 
own exhaustive historical analysis, she concluded that the writ of 
habeas corpus would not have been available to aliens under common 
law at the time of ratification in 1789, and so the Suspension Clause 
                                                                                                                 
140 Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor and Thomas joined. Id. at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In categorical terms that admit 
of no exception, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRAIRA), unambiguously repeals the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the general habeas 
corpus provision), and of all other provisions for judicial review, to deportation challenges 
brought by certain kinds of criminal aliens.” (internal citation omitted)). 
141 Id. at 300. 
142 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  
143 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2006). If the two sentences are read together, the restriction on 
judicial review can be fairly read to apply only to discretionary judgments; if read separately, 
the restriction applies to “any action or decision.” 
144 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517 (“This Court has held that ‘where Congress intends to 
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’” (quoting 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988))). While a total of six justices agreed that the statute 
did not rescind the LPR’s rights to judicial review, Kim lost his constitutional challenge to a 
mandatory pre-hearing detention on the merits. See supra Part I.C.2. 
145 Demore, 538 U.S. at 517. 
146 Id. at 537 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The clarity of § 1226(e)'s text makes such a 
question unavoidable, unlike in St. Cyr, where the Court invoked the doctrine of constitutional 
doubt and interpreted the relevant provisions of AEDPA and IIRAIRA not to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction.”). 
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was inapplicable to any aliens.147 Thus, DeMore on the surface 
supports an LPR’s right to judicial review of questions of law, but 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent showed that the Suspension Clause’s 
applicability, even to LPRs, was not fully resolved. 
B. Enemy Combatants’ Statutory Right to 
 Judicial Review of Detention 
Whereas St. Cyr and Demore wrestled with the availability of 
habeas for LPRs, a line of Guantanamo Bay detention cases 
considered whether habeas could be withheld from inadmissible 
aliens. In Rasul v. Bush,148 the government argued that enemy 
combatants had no right to habeas corpus. The Court avoided any 
constitutional issue by holding that enemy combatants were entitled 
to challenge their detention at Guantanamo Bay under the general 
habeas statute.149 In Justice Kennedy’s noteworthy concurrence, the 
extended nature of the detention was again a deciding factor.150  
By restricting its ruling to the statutory habeas provisions of 
section 2241, Rasul invited Congress to speak clearly regarding the 
access of enemy combatants to habeas review. Congress wasted little 
time. It passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”)151 and 
amended section 2241 to provide that “no court . . . shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . as an enemy 
combatant . . . .”152 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,153 the Supreme Court 
nevertheless allowed Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s 
bodyguard and personal driver, to challenge his detention. Hamdan 
had been in custody since 2001,154 and his case was pending when the 
                                                                                                                 
147 Id. at 537–39 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor stopped just short of 
reaching a final conclusion, noting that the majority accepted jurisdiction and she agreed with 
the majority’s decision on the merits. Id. at 540. 
148 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
149 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006) (stating that “within their respective jurisdictions,” 
federal courts have the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who 
claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States”); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (finding that the courts retained jurisdiction “to 
determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention” of Rasul and similarly 
situated prisoners).  
150 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In light of the status of Guantanamo 
Bay and the indefinite pretrial detention of the detainees, I would hold that federal-court 
jurisdiction is permitted in these cases.”).  
151 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109–148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2739–2744 
(2005). 
152 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1). 
153 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
154 Id. at 566. 
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DTA was enacted.155 Because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the statute concluded that the DTA’s habeas-corpus-stripping 
provision was not intended to be retroactive,156 the provision did not 
apply to Hamdan’s case. This reasoning allowed the Supreme Court 
to uphold Hamdan’s right to judicial review under the general habeas 
statute without deciding whether the Suspension Clause extended to 
inadmissible aliens.157  
C. The Suspension Clause Applies to Inadmissible Aliens  
In response to the Hamdan ruling, Congress “quickly enacted the 
Military Commissions Act, emphatically reasserting that [Congress] 
did not want [Guantanamo] prisoners [to file] habeas petitions.”158 
Enemy combatants filed petitions for habeas review of their 
detention, and there was no longer a plausible reading of the habeas 
statutes by which the Court could retain jurisdiction.159 In 
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court was therefore forced to consider 
whether enemy combatants had “the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus” which could not “be withdrawn except in conformance with 
the Suspension Clause.”160 Justice Kennedy concluded for the Court 
that the Suspension Clause “protects the rights of the detained by 
affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to 
account”161 and “that at common law a petitioner’s status as an alien 
was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief.”162  
                                                                                                                 
155 Id. at 576 (finding that the bar to judicial review did not apply to “this case, which was 
pending at the time the DTA was enacted”). 
156 Id. (rejecting the argument that “Congress' failure to expressly reserve federal courts’ 
jurisdiction over pending cases erects a presumption against jurisdiction” and that the 
presumption is not rebutted by the text). 
157 Id. at 575–76 (“We find it unnecessary to reach either of these [constitutional] 
arguments. Ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the Government's 
theory—at least insofar as this case, which was pending at the time the DTA was enacted, is 
concerned.”); see also Tung Yin, Tom and Jerry (and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the President, the Court, and Congress in the War on Terrorism, 42 TULSA L. REV. 
505, 511 (2007). 
158 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2296 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
159 Id. at 2244 (“[W]e agree with [the Court of Appeals’] conclusion that the MCA 
deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus actions now before 
us.”). 
160 Id. at 2240. The canon of constitutional avoidance can only be utilized when “after the 
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one 
construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between them.” Id. at 2271 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)).  
161 Id. at 2247. 
162 Id. at 2248 (emphasis added). Finding that the United States has de facto sovereignty 
over Guantanamo Bay, the Court rejected the government’s contention that the Suspension 
Clause did not apply to aliens there. It found that the detainees were being “held in a territory 
that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and total control of 
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Having determined that even inadmissible aliens were entitled to 
Suspension Clause protections, the Court had to consider whether the 
procedural protections mandated under the DTA provided adequate 
safeguards, substituting for habeas procedures.163 It found three 
particularly important procedural shortcomings in the statutorily 
prescribed tribunals: (1) The aliens had only “limited means to find or 
present evidence to challenge the Government’s case” against 
them;164 (2) they would have a “personal representative,”165 but they 
would “not have the assistance of counsel” at the tribunal;166 and 
(3) they “may not be aware of the most critical allegations” upon 
which their detention was based.167 
The Court also considered whether prudential concerns required it 
to defer to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which had been granted jurisdiction under the DTA to 
review the constitutionality of the tribunal procedures.168 The Court 
emphasized the importance of the length of detention and concluded 
that because six years had elapsed “without the judicial oversight that 
habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands[,] . . . the costs of 
delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custody. The 
detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus 
hearing.”169 
D. The Significance of Boumediene 
As the culmination of a decade of jurisprudence regarding the 
constitutional rights of aliens to judicial review and freedom from 
extended detention, Boumediene illustrates at least three Court 
leanings. Most dramatically, the Supreme Court for the first time 
afforded an inadmissible alien a substantive constitutional right. 
Specifically, aliens who are inadmissible because they might be 
terrorists or threats to national security had the right to judicial review 
of their detention under the Suspension Clause. Conferring this 
                                                                                                                 
 
our Government.” Id. at 2262. 
163 Id. at 2266 (“[W]e must interpret the DTA and assess its adequacy as a substitute for 
habeas corpus.”). 
164 Id. at 2269. 
165 Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the personal representative “may 
review classified documents at the [tribunal] stage and summarize them for the detainee” and 
that legal counsel would be provided later on appeal before the D.C. Circuit). 
166 Id. at 2269. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 2274. 
169 Id. at 2275. 
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constitutional right on Guantanamo detainees, a small category of 
inadmissible aliens, does not necessarily confer it upon all 
inadmissible aliens. Nevertheless, this substantive constitutional right 
should extend to some other inadmissible aliens.170 Since aliens 
obtain greater rights and privileges as their ties to the community 
become stronger,171 inadmissible aliens who live in the United States 
arguably have at least as great a claim for habeas rights as enemy 
combatants who never set foot on United States soil.   
Additionally, as discussed above, the Court found the DTA’s 
administrative proceedings deficient in their failure both to provide 
legal counsel and to provide the alien a reasonable opportunity to 
develop evidence to challenge the government’s allegations.172 
Finally, the length of detention again appeared to be an important 
factor in the Court’s willingness to assert its authority. 
Finally, Boumediene calls into question foundational arguments in 
the Mezei decision, and, therefore, weakens the “entry fiction,” 
perhaps fatally.173 In Mezei, the most salient reasons for denying an 
alien’s right to procedural due process were his status as an 
inadmissible alien, the territorial ambiguity of Ellis Island as an 
extension of the U.S. border, and the national security interests 
involved. A fair application of Boumediene undermines all three of 
these rationales. First, most inadmissible aliens facing indefinite 
detention have actually lived in the United States and have a greater 
claim to constitutional protections than an enemy combatant. Second, 
the United States has de jure, not merely de facto, sovereignty over 
Ellis Island and its detention centers.174 And, third, enemy combatants 
pose at least as great a threat to national security as Knauff, Mezei, or 
Hernandez–Carrera, the inadmissible alien who is the concern of this 
                                                                                                                 
170 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1034 (“If the Court holds that the Guantanamo detainees 
possess constitutional rights, however, the decision should compel lower courts to conclude that 
(at least some) inadmissible aliens possess constitutional rights.”).  
171 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (noting that an alien is “accorded 
a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society”). 
172 For an alien in DHS detention with poor English skills and limited education, the lack 
of the first (legal representation) necessarily implicates the second (inability to develop 
evidence). 
173 See Slocum, supra note 65, at 1035–36 (expressing doubt that Boumediene will be 
interpreted so expansively as to grant aliens a full panoply of constitutional rights, but 
suggesting that it may minimally serve to weaken the entry fiction, and provide the basis to 
accord inadmissible aliens the same substantive protections as lawful permanent residents 
against indefinite detention).  
174 Boumediene concluded that though the United States does not have de jure sovereignty 
over Guantanamo Bay, its de facto sovereignty is sufficient for habeas corpus rights to apply. 
128 S. Ct. at 2253. 
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Note.175 By undermining the foundations of Mezei, Boumediene poses 
a direct challenge to the continued vitality of the “entry fiction” in 
denying constitutional protections to inadmissible aliens. As the entry 
fiction is a foundational legal construct for denying constitutional 
rights to aliens, to weaken or end the entry fiction is to open the door 
to explicit recognition of a panoply of constitutional rights for aliens.  
The Supreme Court’s rulings in St. Cyr, Demore, and Boumediene, 
when considered alongside Zadvydas, affirm that lawful permanent 
residents and some inadmissible aliens are protected by the 
Constitution when they face prolonged detention. Because the DHS’s 
indefinite-detention regulation falls outside the narrowed ambit of 
plenary power,176 the Supreme Court should assert its authority and 
insist that the DHS respect the due process rights of aliens facing 
indefinite detention. The remaining question to resolve is whether 
those due process rights require the government to abandon its 
indefinite-detention regulation.  
III. THE INDEFINITE-DETENTION REGULATION AND DUE PROCESS  
This Part reviews the constitutional protections enjoyed by citizens 
facing civil commitment, compares these protections to those 
provided to non-citizens by the DHS indefinite-detention regulation, 
and considers whether the DHS regulation violates non-citizens’ 
constitutional rights. Zadvydas recognized the close parallels between 
civil commitment and the earlier DHS indefinite-detention statute.177 
Both allowed open-ended deprivation of liberty outside the context of 
criminal punishment, and both pose serious constitutional questions. 
Less than thirty days after Zadvydas was decided, the Attorney 
General ordered legacy INS “to develop regulations to address . . . 
special circumstances . . . such as . . . especially dangerous 
individuals,” and he required that the regulations “provide 
constitutionally sufficient procedural protections.”178 The result was 
                                                                                                                 
175 It is beyond the scope of this Note, however, to consider the indefinite detention of 
aliens posing a national security threat under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d).  
176 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) only applies to lawful permanent residents and inadmissible aliens 
for whom removal is not possible. Their detention, however, serves no government interest 
related to deportation or exclusion. Boumediene similarly involved aliens outside this ambit, as 
enemy combatants seek to return home, not to enter the United States.  
177 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“[T]his Court has said that 
government detention violates [the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause] unless the detention 
is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special 
and “narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,” where a special justification, such as harm-
threatening mental illness, outweighs the “individual's constitutionally protected interest in 
avoiding physical restraint.”) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).  
178 Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433–34 (July 19, 2001). 
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the indefinite-detention regulation under which Hernandez–Carrera is 
presently held. The regulation functions like a state or federal civil 
commitment statute in that it defines the process for determining 
when someone who is mentally ill should be subject to prolonged 
detention. The Supreme Court’s civil commitment cases along with 
the state and federal statutes they spawned therefore provide a 
standard against which to assess the constitutional validity of the 
indefinite-detention regulation.179 That regulation’s procedures are 
markedly inferior to those that protect citizens, and the Supreme 
Court could invalidate the indefinite-detention regulation based on 
these procedural shortcomings. Nevertheless, in the absence of a clear 
precedent upon which to conclusively gauge the level of procedural 
due process due to aliens, the Court is not compelled to find the 
regulation is unconstitutional. 
Kansas v. Hendricks180 provides the most frequently cited analysis 
of long-term civil commitment. Upholding commitment under the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act,181 the Court repeated its prior 
holding that “[a]n individual's constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden” in the case 
of persons who are “unable to control their behavior and thereby pose 
a danger to the public health and safety.”182 The Court identified three 
requirements for such civil detention. First, confinement must take 
“place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”; 
second, there must be a finding of “dangerousness either to one’s self 
or to others”; and third, the proof of dangerousness must be “coupled 
. . . with the proof of some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ 
or ‘mental abnormality.’”183 These elements indicate the contours of 
both substantive and procedural due process requirements for a civil 
commitment statute. 
A. Substantive Due Process Requirements for Civil Commitment 
The Court first held in Foucha v. Louisiana184 that indefinite civil 
detention violates substantive due process regardless of the 
                                                                                                                 
179 Zadvydas itself relied on the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence to assess 
the constitutional problems inherent in indefinitely detaining aliens. 533 U.S. at 690. 
180 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
181 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005) (providing for the civil commitment of persons 
convicted of a sexually violent crime who are “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence 
if not treated for their mental abnormality or personality disorder”). 
182 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57. 
183 Id. at 357–58. These three elements were later parsed from Hendricks by Kansas v. 
Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–10 (2002). 
184 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
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procedures used unless the individual is found to be both mentally ill 
and dangerous.185 Four years after a man was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric hospital, a hospital 
review board recommended his release. Even though Foucha had 
previously “manifested the reality of anti-social conduct,”186 he had a 
substantive due process right to freedom unless he was both 
“mentally ill and dangerous.”187 Hendricks explained that the mental 
illness requirement could be satisfied by “a ‘mental abnormality’ or 
‘personality disorder’ that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for 
the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’”188 In 
Kansas v. Crane,189 the Court clarified that civil commitment 
proceedings must include “a lack of control determination.”190 
Specifically, the Court emphasized that “there must be proof of 
serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”191 Civil commitment, 
therefore, does not offend a detainee’s substantive due process right 
to be free from prolonged detention when (1) the detainee is 
dangerous and (2) he has a mental illness or mental abnormality that 
creates a serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 
The government’s current indefinite-detention regulation meets 
both prongs of this substantive due process exception. To be detained 
under the DHS regulation, an Immigration Judge must find that: 
(i) [t]he alien has previously committed one or more 
crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16;192  
                                                                                                                 
185 See id. at 79–80 (emphasizing that the testimony in the case did not establish that 
Foucha was suffering from a mental illness, and that therefore Due Process required the State to 
establish the grounds for his confinement). 
186 Id. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 604 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J., concurring)). 
187 Id. at 80 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 
(1983)). The Court in Foucha held that “the Due Process Clause contains a substantive 
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions.” Id. (quoting Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Foucha noted, however, that in addition to incarcerating 
criminals, “[t]he State may also confine a mentally ill person if it shows ‘by clear and 
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 463 
U.S. at 362).  
188 521 U.S. at 358 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)). 
189 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
190 Id. at 412 (“We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim that 
the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in 
Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”). 
191 Id. at 413. Lower courts have generally concluded, “[a] fair reading of Crane, however, 
requires no explicit finding [of lack of ability to control dangerous behavior] as long as the 
evidence presented proves ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’” Richard S. v. Carpinello, 
589 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413).  
192 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
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(ii) [d]ue to a mental condition or personality disorder and 
behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the alien 
is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and  
(iii) [n]o conditions of release can reasonably be expected 
to ensure the safety of the public.193  
Though the earlier indefinite-detention regulation detaining all 
inadmissible aliens and lawful residents created serious constitutional 
problems in its expansiveness, the new regulation avoids the 
problems by restricting detention to aliens who are both mentally ill 
and dangerous.194 Based on Foucha, as interpreted by Hendricks and 
Crane, the DHS regulation satisfies substantive due process.  
B. Procedural Due Process 
1. Constitutional Requirements for Civil Commitment 
In Addington v. Texas195 the Court asserted, “civil commitment for 
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection.”196 Due to the risk of error in making 
a commitment determination, the Court insisted that the government’s 
burden of proof be greater than a preponderance of the evidence,197 
and it set “clear and convincing evidence” as the minimum standard 
for all civil commitment cases.198  
As to whether an administrative hearing is sufficient for civil 
commitment, virtually every state requires a formal judicial 
hearing.199 The Adam Walsh Act, which authorizes civil commitment 
                                                                                                                 
 
property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense.”). 
193 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii) (2010). 
194 Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008). 
195 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
196 Id. at 425. 
197 Id. at 427 (“The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of 
error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to 
the state. We conclude that the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment 
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify 
confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.”). 
198 Id. at 433 (“[T]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard . . . is required to meet due process 
guarantees . . . .”). 
199  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27:10 (West 2010) (defining New Jersey court 
proceedings which must precede involuntary commitment); N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 9.31 
(McKinney 2006) (requiring judicial review within sixty days of any civil commitment of a 
person in New York); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.38 (West 2010) (making judicial review 
available in Ohio “upon written request by any [civilly committed individual], his guardian, or 
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of a sexually dangerous person currently in federal prison, also 
requires a judicial hearing.200 Though the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly made such a finding, “[t]here is no longer any serious 
question as to the constitutional requirement of some kind of a 
judicial hearing prior to an order of involuntary civil commitment.”201  
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on a free person’s right 
to court-appointed counsel prior to civil commitment, but it has 
answered a related question. In Vitek v. Jones,202 the Supreme Court 
considered whether Nebraska could transfer an indigent prisoner to a 
mental institution without affording him access to counsel. The Court 
pointed out that Jones was due less protection than a free citizen 
because his conviction had extinguished his right to freedom from 
confinement for the duration of his sentence.203 Nevertheless, four 
justices recognized a categorical requirement for court-appointed 
counsel, and Justice Powell’s concurrence decided the issue.204 He 
held that qualified and independent assistance must be provided, but 
that it need not be an attorney in all situations.205 Crucial to the 
Court’s reasoning, according to Justice Powell, was that a person 
“threatened with involuntary transfer to mental hospitals will 
[unlikely] possess the competence or training to protect adequately 
his own interest.”206  
Though the Supreme Court has not decided whether a free person 
has a per se guarantee of counsel in civil commitment proceedings, 
the Second Circuit has resolved the question affirmatively. In Project 
                                                                                                                 
 
the chief clinical officer to the probate court”); see also RALPH REISNER, ET AL., LAW AND THE 
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 781–86 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
the significant differences among the states with regard to the burden of proof required at the 
civil commitment hearings, as well as the role and composition of the ultimate decisionmaker). 
200 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). 
201 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 60 (1994).  
202 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
203 See id. at 492 (“Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these 
consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally 
infringed absent compliance with the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.”). 
204 See id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that an inmate whom 
the State wishes to transfer indefinitely to a mental health institution is entitled to some form of 
representation). 
205 Id. (“I do not agree, however, that the requirement of independent assistance demands 
that a licensed attorney be provided.”). Justice Powell identified two factors to decide if counsel 
should be required: “(i) the existence of factual disputes or issues which are ‘complex or 
otherwise difficult to develop or present,’ and (ii) ‘whether the probationer appears to be 
capable of speaking effectively for himself.’” Id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973)). 
206 Id. at 498. 
 1/11/2011 12:43:10 PM 
2011] ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION 33 
Release v. Prevost,207 the Second Circuit reviewed the constitutional 
adequacy of New York’s civil commitment procedures. It concluded 
that a “right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings may be 
gleaned from the Supreme Court's recognition that commitment 
involves a substantial curtailment of liberty and thus requires due 
process protection.”208 The Second Circuit, therefore, has filled a gap 
in the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence by affirming 
a person’s right to counsel at a civil commitment judicial hearing. 
Constitutional protections from civil commitment of citizens have 
been well established. The Supreme Court clearly stated that 
involuntary civil commitment is “a massive curtailment of liberty,”209 
and that the burden is on the government to show mental illness and 
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Courts and 
commentators agree that due process requires a judicial hearing and, 
for the indigent, court-appointed counsel. It is illustrative to compare 
these three protections with those provided by the DHS under 8 
C.F.R. § 241.14(f)-(h). 
2. Shortcomings of the DHS Indefinite-Detention Regulation 
Consistent with constitutional requirements, the DHS regulation 
places the burden of proof on the government to show by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that “[d]ue to a mental condition or personality 
disorder and behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the 
alien is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and [n]o 
conditions of release can reasonably be expected to ensure the safety 
of the public.”210 The regulation’s shortcomings, however, are 
significant. The merits hearing is administrative, not judicial, so the 
detainee is without the protection of customary rules of evidence and 
procedure.211 Indigent detainees are not provided counsel,212 and, 
                                                                                                                 
207 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). 
208 Id. at 976.  
209 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491 (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). 
210 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(f)(1), (i)(1) (2010). 
211 In Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, the Tenth Circuit argued that due process is satisfied 
by the availability of judicial review at the appellate court level. 547 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“This is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”). As discussed 
in Part II, however, IIRAIRA stripped away review of discretionary and factual findings, thus 
preventing the alien from challenging the dangerousness finding unless in some way the 
“commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power.” Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 306 (2001)). 
212 If free immigration detention legal services are available in the area, the detainee will 
be provided a list of such services, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(g)(3)(i), but there is no assurance that the 
services will be forthcoming. 
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though the government must use an expert witness, 213 there is no 
provision for an indigent detainee to be provided independent expert 
testimony.214  
The lack of counsel and expert testimony are major obstacles to an 
immigration judge’s fact finding. Aliens in DHS detention often have 
poor English skills, limited education, and heavily constrained access 
to the outside world.215 Consequently, they have almost no 
opportunity to prepare meaningful evidence to rebut the government’s 
contentions of dangerousness. The importance of being able to 
prepare a defense was underscored by Boumediene.216 There, the 
enemy combatant’s inability to develop evidence was among three 
identified deficiencies that required the Court to reject the Detainee 
Treatment Act’s procedures.217 Cut off from the outside world, the 
lack of counsel makes it virtually impossible for the alien to mount 
even a nominal defense. 
The DHS regulation’s protections of aliens would be 
constitutionally deficient if applied to a citizen due to their failure to 
require a judicial hearing and guarantee access to counsel. These 
shortcomings are not merely theoretical, but seriously undermine the 
alien’s ability to protect himself from unnecessary indefinite 
detention. Boumediene suggests that these deficiencies may make the 
DHS regulation constitutionally unacceptable even in the context of 
an alien’s protection.  
3. Alternative to the DHS Indefinite-Detention Regulation 
It would not be a burden on the DHS to remedy these deficiencies. 
The primary purpose of the DHS indefinite-detention regulation is to 
protect the public.218 Prior to the completion of the alien’s criminal 
                                                                                                                 
213 The government is required to commission a report by a Public Health Services 
physician based on a physical and mental examination of the detainee. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(3). 
The report must make a recommendation “whether, due to a mental condition or personality 
disorder and behavior associated with that condition or disorder, the alien is likely to engage in 
acts of violence in the future.” Id. Of note is that the likelihood “to engage in acts of violence” is 
not conditioned upon the absence or presence of DHS-imposed release conditions.  
214 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(f)–(h). The DHS regulation also provides no requirement that the 
detainee receive treatment to rehabilitate him and return him to health so that he may return to 
society. Id. 
215 See, e.g., Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 551, 
567 (1999) (“Detainees' ability to make telephone calls to lawyers or to their families for 
assistance in their cases is severely restricted.”). 
216 See supra Part II.C. 
217 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269–70 (2008). 
218 See Notice of Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 38433 (July 19, 2001). The Attorney General 
ordered legacy INS to draft the regulation as part of efforts to “ensure that we take all 
responsible steps to protect the public.” Id. 
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sentence, the DHS could complete removal proceedings, issue its 
formal removal order, and coordinate travel documents with the 
alien’s home country. At the completion of his sentence, the DHS 
could promptly remove him. If, as is the case with Hernandez–
Carrera, the country has no extradition agreement or is otherwise 
unwilling to accept him, then upon the expiration of his prison 
sentence, the DHS could release him subject to supervision. If the 
DHS has concerns about the alien’s mental illness and future 
dangerousness, it could notify state authorities well in advance of the 
alien’s release. To preserve public safety, the state could institute the 
same civil commitment proceedings as it would if the alien were a 
mentally ill citizen completing a criminal sentence.219  
There are several practical reasons for the DHS to proceed in this 
fashion and turn over a potentially dangerous post-removal-order 
alien to the appropriate state civil commitment regime. The states 
presumably have greater experience and expertise than the DHS 
whose primary mission is to apprehend and remove inadmissible 
aliens, not detain them. Moreover, the states have better procedural 
protections and a more developed jurisprudence that would reduce the 
risk of imprisoning an alien unnecessarily at substantial government 
expense.220 The states would also provide better rehabilitative 
services,221 helping return the alien to a productive life.  
It is arguably more efficient, more reliable, and less costly to allow 
states to retain control over non-removable and potentially dangerous 
aliens at the end of their criminal sentence. Just because it is smarter, 
however, does not necessarily mean that it is constitutionally 
compelled. Nor does the DHS regulation’s failure to provide a 
judicial hearing and the guarantee of counsel necessarily violate due 
process. Though the DHS regulations would be constitutionally 
                                                                                                                 
219 For example, if Hernandez–Carrera today was completing a Kansas prison sentence for 
sexual assault, and it was feared he would pose a threat of violence upon his release, the DHS 
could leave him in Kansas custody. Ninety days before the end of his prison sentence, the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act would require a psychiatric evaluation and judicial 
hearing to determine if civil commitment was necessary. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (2005). 
If there were no Kansas act, the Adams Walsh Act would fill the gap, again requiring both a 
psychiatric evaluation and judicial hearing with full procedural protections. Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). 
220 The DHS detention budget for the 2010 fiscal year is $1.7 billion. National Immigration 
Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention, BACKGROUNDER 1 (July 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf. 
221 See, e.g., Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and Mental Health 
Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 693, 694 (2009) (“On any given day, there are over thirty thousand immigrants placed in 
privately run detention facilities around the country who are unable to access appropriate 
medical and mental health support or services.”). 
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deficient if they governed citizens, the regulations may still satisfy 
due process for non-citizens.222 Landon v. Plasencia223 provided a 
framework for evaluating what process may be due to a non-citizen.  
C. Application of Eldridge Analysis 
“The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Landon v. Plasencia 
marked the arrival of the due process revolution in immigration 
law.”224 Plasencia was an LPR taken into custody while reentering the 
country after helping several aliens enter the country unlawfully. 
During the process to remove her from the United States, the DHS 
denied her the procedural protections normally afforded an LPR being 
deported. Instead, it allowed her only the protections available to an 
inadmissible alien in “exclusion” hearings. In Plasencia, the Court 
applied the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge225 to assess 
whether the procedural protections available in an exclusion hearing 
were constitutionally sufficient for an LPR. 226 Because Plasencia had 
been caught smuggling, the Court determined that she was not 
entitled to the protections typically available to an LPR. Nevertheless, 
the Court insisted that the exclusion hearing procedures might still be 
inadequate.227  
Plasencia’s significance was twofold: it explicitly recognized an 
alien’s constitutional right to procedural due process;228 and it 
implicitly recognized the applicability of the Eldridge procedural due 
process analysis to regulations concerning aliens. Eldridge has been 
criticized for undervaluing individual rights,229 but it has the 
                                                                                                                 
222 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and 
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion 
that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship . . . .”). 
223 459 U.S. 21 (1982).  
224 Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates 
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1652 (1992) (footnote omitted) 
(observing that Landon v. Plasencia was the first case in which a court used procedural due 
process arguments to protect aliens’ substantive constitutional rights). 
225 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge is “the 
cornerstone for all analysis of procedural adequacy.” 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES 
H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8129(a) (2006).  
226 Landon v. Plasencia recognized Eldridge as providing the appropriate framework by 
which to evaluate Plasencia’s procedural challenges. 459 U.S. at 34. 
227 Because the impact of the deficiencies and the burden on the government of curing 
them had not been briefed, the Court declined to reach a conclusion, instead remanding the 
question to the lower court. Id. at 37. 
228 See supra note 73, and accompanying text. 
229 See Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 740 (1995) (asserting that the Eldridge analysis “ignores the inherent 
value of individual rights”). 
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flexibility to adapt to harsh governmental action like that of the 
indefinite-detention regulation. Judge Friendly explained,  
“Deprivation of liberty . . . is the harshest action the state can 
take against the individual through the administrative process. 
The Supreme Court thus was right in demanding a very high 
level of procedural protection . . . . Civil commitment 
warrants a similarly high [level of procedural protection.]”230  
Protecting immigrants from the “harshest action the state can take” 
with only watered-down procedures should invoke healthy 
skepticism.  
In Eldridge, the Court created a three-factor balancing test to 
evaluate whether administrative procedures conform to due process. 
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must 
consider [1] the interest at stake for the individual, [2] the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the 
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or 
different procedural safeguards, and [3] the interest of the 
government in using the current procedures rather than 
additional or different procedures.231  
Both the second and third factors of the Eldridge test require a 
comparison of the challenged procedures to “different or additional 
procedures.” For the purpose of applying the Eldridge analysis to the 
DHS regulation, the “different or additional procedures” compared in 
this Note are those proposed in Part III.B.3. At the completion of an 
alien’s criminal prison sentence, if his home country will not accept 
him and there are concerns about his dangerousness, he is left in the 
custody of the state or federal authority. The alien is then subject to 
the same civil commitment regime (and attendant protections) as a 
citizen. The second and third parts of the Eldridge analysis therefore 
compare the procedures of the DHS indefinite-detention regulation to 
the civil commitment procedures and protections provided to citizens 
under state and federal statutes. 
The first factor of the Eldridge analysis, “the interest at stake for 
the individual,” weighs heavily for the detained alien who faces the 
prospect of indefinite detention. Short of capital punishment, it is hard 
to imagine an interest that is weightier than indefinite loss of freedom. 
The second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest 
                                                                                                                 
230 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975). 
231 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334–35). 
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. . . [and] the probable value of additional or different procedural 
safeguards” assesses the increased risk of unnecessary detention 
under the current DHS procedures as compared to state or federal 
civil commitment procedures. The additional risk is significant. That 
all states and the federal Adam Walsh Act require both a judicial 
hearing and court-appointed counsel in civil commitment proceedings 
indicates the importance of these safeguards and the risk created by 
their absence. The first and second factors therefore both weigh 
heavily against the constitutional adequacy of the DHS procedures.  
As to the third factor, “the interest of the government,” Plasencia 
shows how the Court could weigh the government’s interest in the 
existing DHS procedures.232 In Plasencia, the Court recognized two 
government interests: the Court’s tradition of plenary power233 and its 
avoidance of an “undue burden.”234 Both concerns are considerably 
less weighty here than in Plasencia. First, Plasencia was being denied 
entry into the country—a government action in which plenary power 
deference is strongest.235 In contrast, as noted by both Zadvydas and 
Demore, post-removal-order detention is outside the ambit of plenary 
power because it does not involve exclusion or deportation.236 
Moreover, Boumediene and Zadvydas demonstrate the Court’s 
readiness to challenge the political branches where non-removal 
detention of aliens becomes prolonged. The concern about plenary 
power would therefore have little or no weight.  
Efficient administration of immigration law is also a less serious 
concern here than it was in Plasencia. In that case, a decision that 
more process was required would have required that legacy INS 
institute additional procedures before excluding any LPR, thus 
dramatically increasing the government’s workload. In contrast, if 
aliens in Hernandez–Carrera’s situation were simply turned over to 
state and federal civil commitment authorities, the DHS would be 
freed of an administrative burden for which it has less expertise and 
                                                                                                                 
232 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34. 
233 Id. (“The Government's interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws at 
the border also is weighty. Further, it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over 
matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive 
and the Legislature.”). 
234 Id. at 36. 
235 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (creating the plenary power 
doctrine in a case where a returning lawful permanent resident was denied reentry to the United 
States). 
236 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (justifying the Court’s deference to Congress 
in a pre-removal detention statute by distinguishing Zadvydas in which indefinite detention “did 
not serve its purported immigration purpose” since “removal was ‘no longer practically 
attainable.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001))). 
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experience. Consequently, the third Eldridge factor, the DHS’s 
interest in retaining its existing procedures, deserves significantly less 
weight here than in Plasencia.  
That the first two Eldridge factors weigh heavily in favor of the 
individual alien, and that the third factor weighs relatively lightly for 
the government may seem to imply that the DHS regulation provides 
constitutionally insufficient process. This is not, however, a necessary 
conclusion. 
D. Creating a Procedural Due Process Benchmark 
The Supreme Court has implied on numerous occasions that 
aliens, even lawful permanent residents, may be entitled to less due 
process protection than a citizen.237 If aliens are entitled to less 
process, then the Court can give less weight to the individual’s 
interests or greater weight to the government’s interests. The pivotal 
unanswered question is how much more or less weight.238 If 
Plasencia had definitively decided that exclusion protections were 
insufficient for Plasencia, the Court would have provided a 
touchstone for future due process evaluations. In Plasencia, however, 
the government had not briefed the Court on the burden that would be 
created by remedying the procedural deficiencies.239 Rather than 
unilaterally define minimal procedural protections based on 
incomplete information, the Court remanded the case.240 If, as argued 
by Justice Marshall in his concurrence, the Court had taken the extra 
step and found the exclusion procedures constitutionally defective,241 
it would have created a benchmark for immigrant due process. Future 
courts could compare the governmental and individual interests in 
                                                                                                                 
237 See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694; Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–34; Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). 
238 The only other Supreme Court case applying the Eldridge due process analysis to aliens 
was Boumediene. There, the majority used the first two factors of the Eldridge analysis to 
invalidate the procedural protections provided by the DTA’s statutory proceedings, but it never 
discussed the third factor. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2267–68 (2008). The dissent 
reached a different conclusion in part by noting the government’s interest in not burdening its 
war-making responsibilities. Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
239 459 U.S. at 37 n.9. 
240 Id. at 37. Landon v. Plasencia prompted a dialogue between Congress and the Supreme 
Court, which ultimately resulted in the 1996 IIRAIRA conflation of deportation and exclusion 
procedural protections, thus vindicating Plasencia’s insistence on greater protections for 
exclusion. Kevin R. Johnson, Maria and Joseph Plasencia’s Lost Weekend: The Case of Landon 
v. Plasencia, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 221, 240 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 
2005). 
241 459 U.S. at 38 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The Court has already set out the standards 
to be applied in resolving the question. Therefore, rather than just remand, I would first hold that 
respondent was denied due process. . . .”). 
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Plasencia to the ones before the court. As discussed above, the 
government’s interest in retaining the indefinite-detention regulation 
is less weighty than its interest was in Plasencia, and the individual’s 
interest in striking it down is considerably stronger. If Plasencia had 
provided a determinative ruling, one might with certainty conclude 
that Eldridge compels the Court to invalidate the procedures of the 
DHS indefinite-detention regulation. Absent any precedential 
benchmark, however, the Court is not compelled to find the DHS 
regulation constitutionally invalid. 
This Note invites the Supreme Court to use the DHS indefinite-
detention regulation as a first step in establishing such a benchmark 
for due process. As the individual’s interests are extreme, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of liberty is significant, and the 
government’s interest in efficiency is minimal, the Eldridge analysis 
easily leads to such a conclusion. As Justice Kennedy, the probable 
fifth justice in such a case, has expressed particular concern with 
extended detention and insufficient due process, there is some reason 
to hope that the Court will choose such a path. 
IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION  
This Part considers whether constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection require that an alien have the same protection from 
indefinite detention as a citizen. Indigent citizens with mental illness 
who are completing prison terms for violent crimes are subject to civil 
commitment only after a judicial review finds that they pose a serious 
danger to the public.242 Under existing federal and state statutes, they 
will also have access to counsel.243 A similarly situated alien may be 
committed after an administrative review during which he has no 
access to counsel.244 A clear disparity in procedural protections exists. 
Equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may 
apply to the disparate application of statutory procedural protections 
to different classes of persons.245 It is nevertheless unlikely that equal 
                                                                                                                 
242 See supra note 202 and accompanying text describing representative civil commitment 
requirements for judicial review. 
243 See supra Part III.B.1. 
244 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.14(g)–(i) (2010) (omitting a right to an attorney). 
245 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (striking down as an equal 
protection violation an Illinois statute which effectively separated persons bringing unjust 
termination claims before the state’s Fair Employment Practices Commission into two groups, 
giving force to claims the state processed within 120 days and allowing no recourse for claims 
whose processing was delayed); see also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component 
prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups.”).  
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protection will compel relief for the disparate protections afforded 
aliens facing “civil commitment” under the DHS indefinite-detention 
regulation.  
Equal protection applies only to disparate treatment by the same 
governmental sovereign.246 Consequently, it does not prohibit 
disparate treatment under a federal regulation such as section 
241.14(f) and a state regulation providing greater protections to 
citizens. It is conceivable that an alien finishing a federal sentence for 
a violent sex crime and then detained under the DHS indefinite-
detention regulation, could bring an equal protection challenge. He 
would have a valid claim of disparate treatment under federal 
regulations. The scenario, however, is unlikely. Of the challenges to 
the DHS regulation that reached the circuit courts, none involved an 
alien convicted of a violent crime under federal law.247 
Even if such a case emerged, aliens making an equal protection 
claim have a high threshold when challenging disparate treatment 
under federal law. In Mathews v. Diaz, the foundational equal 
protection case for aliens challenging federal statutes, the Supreme 
Court required only a rational basis analysis to justify discrimination 
against aliens.248 Medicare benefits were denied to inadmissible aliens 
and LPRs with fewer than five years of residency.249 The Court 
recognized the federal government’s legitimate interest in protecting 
the program’s fiscal integrity by denying Medicare to some lawful 
permanent residents. It also found that inadmissible immigrants could 
not advance “even a colorable constitutional claim” to the bounty of a 
nation.250 The Court reasoned that because the federal government’s 
immigration-and-naturalization authority gave it deportation power 
over aliens that is unavailable over citizens, discriminating between 
                                                                                                                 
246 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1996) (holding that for the purposes of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state of Colorado and its political 
subdivisions are a single sovereign and must be impartial to all who seek their assistance). 
247 These cases include: Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008) (Louisiana law); 
Hernandez–Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (Kansas law); Tuan Thai v. 
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (Washington law); Rosales–Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 
386 (6th Cir. 2003) (Kentucky law); Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(Minnesota law); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (Florida law); Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal 
smuggling law); Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (Washington law); and Zadvydas v. 
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (New York law). 
248 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976) (justifying the requirement that federal Medicare benefits be 
restricted to LPRs with at least five years of residency on the basis that “neither requirement is 
wholly irrational”). 
249 Id. at 71.  
250 Id. at 80. 
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citizens and aliens is not necessarily invidious, even if the alien has 
lawful resident status.251  
It is highly unlikely that an alien, whether an LPR or an 
inadmissible alien, could successfully challenge disparate treatment 
under a rational basis analysis. In the case of an illegal alien, 
providing less robust procedural protections from indefinite detention 
might rationally serve the government’s interest in deterring the flow 
of unlawful immigration.252 In the case of a lawful permanent 
resident, lesser due process protections might rationally serve the 
government’s legitimate interest in inducing aliens to naturalize.  
Because equal protection jurisprudence requires only a rational 
basis for treating citizens and aliens differently under federal law, 
there is little reason to expect that the Supreme Court would strike 
down the DHS indefinite-detention regulation on equal protection 
grounds.253  
V. POLICY REASONS FOR INVALIDATING DHS  
INDEFINITE-DETENTION REGULATION 
As concluded above in Parts III and IV, the Supreme Court is not 
compelled to strike down the DHS indefinite-detention regulation on 
either due process or equal protection grounds. Nevertheless, a future 
challenge to this regulation may provide the Court the opportunity to 
complete the work it left unfinished in Plasencia. Plasencia and 
Eldridge provide the Court ample room to strike down the indefinite-
detention regulation and establish a benchmark for evaluating the 
procedural sufficiency of other regulations governing aliens. Part V 
outlines two policy reasons why the Supreme Court should do so; 
and, if it does not, why Congress should clarify that section 241.14(f) 
does not authorize indefinite detention.  
                                                                                                                 
251 Id. (“The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no 
permissible counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own 
citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in 
itself imply that such disparate treatment is ‘invidious.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
252 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002) (upholding 
the punitive denial of back pay to an illegal alien fired in violation of NLRB regulations as a 
permissible deterrent to illegal immigration). 
253 It is beyond the scope of this Note to argue that the Supreme Court should revise its 
equal protection jurisprudence and require federal discrimination against LPRs to withstand 
strict scrutiny, as state discrimination is required to do. 
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A. Simple Fairness and Humanity 
First, simple fairness and humanity require it. Fairness in 
government action is a core American value.254 Stringent procedural 
safeguards are built into the United States criminal justice system 
because the consequences of criminal convictions are potentially 
severe.255 Citizens facing the possibility of civil commitment are 
protected by rigorous due process.256 Such protections of liberty are 
enshrined in the Constitution; and “fundamental fairness” is 
guaranteed to all persons under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.257 Nevertheless, twenty-five million United States 
immigrants—our neighbors and friends—may be deprived of basic 
liberty protections without the most basic judicial protections.258 
Aliens may be subjected to indefinite detention under section 
241.14(f) without the benefit of a judicial hearing or court-provided 
counsel.259 Justice Field wrote that “[a]s to its cruelty, nothing can 
exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one's residence, and 
the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family and 
business.”260 Yet, that cruelty is exacted upon long-time alien 
members of our communities as a routine matter, often over the 
period of just a few days by the mere action of an administrative 
                                                                                                                 
254 See Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping American 
Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 23 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (listing 
fairness and equality of opportunity as among America’s core values). 
255 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 473 (2007) (pointing 
out the dangers of importing criminal justice norms into immigration law ). 
256 See supra Part III.B.1. 
257 Pedersen v. S. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(“Essentially, fundamental fairness is what due process means.” (citing Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950))). 
258 Approximately half are lawful permanent residents and half are illegal aliens. Nancy 
Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008, Population Estimates, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf. Some 
commentators have suggested that the sheer number and rootedness of illegal immigrants in our 
society and national economy argue for a new approach to their rights relative to those of lawful 
permanent residents. See Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The 
Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) (“The 
claim that illegal immigrants should receive the same level of equal protection of the laws as 
legal immigrants gains further, normative support from the application of a participation model 
of rights. . . . [This model] is premised on the idea that membership in a community is what 
matters morally when it comes to the distribution of most Constitutional protections and 
government benefits.”).  
259 Detainees are allowed to be represented at no cost to the government, and, in cities 
where pro bono services exist, detainees are given a list of free legal service providers. See 8 
C.F.R. § 241.14(g)(3)(i). However, there is no assurance that such services will be available.  
260 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893)  (Field, J., dissenting).  
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hearing in which the alien has no representation.261 Mentally ill 
persons subject to the DHS regulation are, despite their 
dangerousness, among the most vulnerable in the population. They 
suffer from a debility over which they have little or no control. To 
imprison them for life with little or no medical treatment262 and 
without the procedural protections provided to citizens, is ignoble and 
beneath the ideals of this nation.263 
B. The Risk of Further Entrenching an Underclass of Aliens  
Second, judicially or legislatively invalidating the DHS indefinite-
detention regulation is a small but necessary step in dismantling a 
two-tiered system of constitutional rights. Disparate treatment of the 
profoundly mentally ill is but part of a larger societal trend whereby 
the nation has pushed immigrants into the shadows. President George 
W. Bush correctly observed, “illegal immigrants live in the shadows 
of our society. . . . [T]he vast majority . . . are decent people who 
work hard, support their families, practice their faith, and lead 
responsible lives. They are part of American life, but they are beyond 
the reach and protection of American law.”264 Nor are illegal 
                                                                                                                 
261 During the first six months of 2009, more than two-thirds of the over 1,600 removals 
presided over by the Cleveland Immigration Court were pro se. Dep’t of Justice, Executive 
Office of Immigration Review, Cleveland Caseload: Pro Se vs. Represented, (July 2009) 
(custom report on file with the author). 
262  See ACLU Sues U.S. Immigration Officials and For-Profit Corrections Corporation 
Over Grossly Deficient Health Care, ACLU, (June 13, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-
rights/aclu-sues-us-immigration-officials-and-profit-corrections-corporation-over-grossly. 
(“[D]etainees are routinely subjected to long delays before treatment, denied necessary 
medication for chronic illnesses, and refused essential referrals prescribed by medical staff.”).  
263 See, e.g., David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights 
as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 378 (2003) (“The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clauses should also apply equally to citizens and noncitizens. If the state cannot 
take a citizen’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law, why should it be able to take 
a noncitizen’s life, liberty or property without due process? It is generally just as much an 
imposition on a foreign national’s physical freedom to be locked up as it is an imposition on a 
citizen’s freedom. The government sometimes argues that noncitizens are entitled to diminished 
due process, but it is not clear why that should be so.”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 984 (2002) (“[W]hile the rights of aliens are undoubtedly qualified in certain 
circumstances, these circumstances do not justify the imposition of a double standard across the 
board. Rather, they suggest that outside of a declared war against an identifiable nation, aliens 
living among us are entitled to those constitutional rights not expressly restricted to citizens, 
including most critically the rights of due process, political freedom, and equal protection.”); 
Clay McCaslin, “My Jailor is My Judge”: Kestutis Zadvydas and the Indefinite Imprisonment of 
Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 230 (2000) (“To imprison a person 
indefinitely after completion of his or her criminal sentence . . . offends every conceivable 
notion of due process and liberty contained in the United States Constitution. For these 
unfortunate individuals, a simple error in judgment can result in a lifetime of hell at the hands of 
the U.S. government.”). 
264 George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to the Nation on Immigration 
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immigrants the only aliens denied fundamental protections. Lawful 
permanent residents as well as illegal immigrants are subject to the 
DHS indefinite-detention regulation, and LPRs may be deported for 
offenses as trivial as shoplifting.265 Immigration Control and 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers may with impunity enter any alien’s 
home without a warrant and interrogate his children regarding his 
parents’ and relatives’ immigration status.266 In some communities, 
parents cannot walk their children to school or drive to the grocery 
store for fear of being unlawfully interrogated by ICE. By causing 
millions of our immigrant neighbors to fear the government, these 
policies make them susceptible to exploitation and abuse.   
The Supreme Court itself recognized in Plyler v. Doe267 the danger 
of perpetuating a permanent subclass of persons within the country. In 
that case, the Court considered a Texas school law that denied free 
elementary education to immigrants who entered without proper 
documentation.268 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that the 
Constitution protects aliens as “persons” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment even if they are in the United States unlawfully.269 
Though prior Supreme Court precedents had required strict scrutiny 
analysis when lawful permanent residents challenged state law on 
equal protection grounds,270 illegal immigrants had never been 
afforded greater protection than that of a rational basis review. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Reform, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 924, 931 (May 15, 2006). 
265 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (making a lawful permanent resident removable 
for a crime of moral turpitude when it is a second offense); Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F. Supp. 
2d 1005, 1010–1012 (E.D. Penn. 2003) (holding shoplifting to be a crime of moral turpitude 
under the federal immigration law).. 
266 Because deportation is a civil action, information gleaned from such 4th Amendment 
violations are rarely subject to exclusion. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 
(1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings). 
267 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
268 Id. at 205. 
269 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is 
surely a ‘person’” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also, id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are 
indeed physically ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a state.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
270 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down Arizona and 
Pennsylvania laws denying welfare benefits to lawful permanent residents). The Court 
explained that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ . . . 
for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 
(1977) (striking down New York law denying college scholarships to foreign born lawful 
permanent residents who chose not to relinquish their foreign citizenship). 
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Nevertheless, Plyler “employed a heightened level of rational basis 
review” to strike down the Texas law.271 Justice Powell defended the 
approach as a proper response to the “lifelong penalty and stigma” 
that would attach to immigrant children who lacked an education.272 
He explained, “[a] legislative classification that threatens the creation 
of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled 
with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”273 Though the Plyler dissent objected to the plurality’s 
undisguised policy making,274 it fully agreed with the ends of that 
policy.275  
Plyler may have been constitutionally infirm in its reasoning, but 
by assuring immigrant children’s access to basic education, it helped 
avoid deepening the shadow into which immigrants are forced to 
retreat. The Supreme Court acknowledged that while immigrants’ 
labor is welcome, they are “virtually defenseless against any abuse, 
exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the state’s natural 
citizens and business organizations may wish to subject them.”276 
They can be deprived of fair wages and safe working conditions and 
they can be subject to workplace sexual abuse, domestic violence, and 
human trafficking with impunity by those who rely on their fear of 
deportation.277 Every time immigration laws are made harsher and 
procedural protections weaker, the immigrant community is made 
more fearful and pushed deeper into the shadows. “This situation 
raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident 
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, 
                                                                                                                 
271 LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005). 
272 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). 
273 Id.  
274 Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is 
acting to make up for Congress’ lack of ‘effective leadership’ . . . .”). 
275 Id. (“I fully agree that it would be folly—and wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment 
of society made up of illiterate persons . . . .”). 
276 Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 n.18 (E.D. Tex. 1978)). 
277 See Laura Carothers Graham, Relief for Battered Women Under the Violence Against 
Women Act, 10 DEL. L. REV. 263, 263 (2008) (“A large number of immigrant victims of 
domestic violence cite fear of being reported to immigration authorities by their abuser . . . [as 
one of] their main bases for remaining in an abusive relationship.”); Suzanne H. Jackson, To 
Honor and Obey: Trafficking in “Mail-Order Brides,” 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 477 (2002) 
(“[T]raffickers . . . abuse people physically and sexually, confiscating passports and threatening 
deportation.”); Gerhard A. Miller, Immigration and National Law, 1977 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
205, 228 (“Once the aliens arrive, they live under the constant fear of detection and deportation, 
and are thus easily exploited . . . .”); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: 
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 158 (2007) 
(discussing the magnitude of human trafficking on immigrants subject to deportation).  
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but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available 
to citizens and lawful residents.”278 
Aliens detained indefinitely under the DHS regulation are less 
sympathetic than the school children of Plyler, but this does not make 
their plight less important. The regulation’s anemic protections 
unnecessarily impose the risk of lifelong incarceration.279 The 
regulation’s procedures would be clearly unconstitutional if they were 
used as a civil commitment mechanism for similarly situated 
citizens.280 The regulation is therefore a piece of the dark patchwork 
of United States immigration laws that relegates our alien neighbors 
to the shadows of society. Whether it is by Supreme Court action on 
due process grounds or by Congressional fiat, the invalidation of the 
DHS regulation would help the nation move back toward its 
egalitarian ideal. 
CONCLUSION 
Santos Hernandez–Carrera committed a crime, and his prison 
sentence paid his debt to society. His subsequent seventeen years of 
imprisonment and the lifetime of detention before him are 
unconscionable unless the detention is necessary to keep him from 
harming society. If the necessity of his incarceration had been 
litigated with the protections available to a citizen, Hernandez–
Carrera would almost certainly be a free man. But the procedural due 
process ensured to a citizen was not provided, and he faces a lifetime 
in prison. Such denial of foundational constitutional rights relegates 
Hernandez–Carrera and millions of law-abiding aliens to a life of fear 
and injustice.  
During the past ten years, the Supreme Court narrowed plenary 
power in immigration law, explicitly recognized some inadmissible 
aliens’ constitutional right to habeas corpus, and implicitly recognized 
a substantive right of lawful permanent residents to be free from 
indefinite detention. Zadvydas and Boumediene seriously undermined 
Mezei, and, with it, the entry fiction doctrine. The Supreme Court is 
now free to consider the sufficiency of the procedural due process 
provided by the DHS indefinite-detention regulation. The question is 
a close one, but a fair application of Eldridge balancing does not quite 
                                                                                                                 
278 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218–19. 
279 Four of five of Hernandez–Carrera’s professional psychiatric evaluators concluded that 
the public would be safe if he was released with modest restrictive conditions. Brief for 
Appellees, supra note 2, at 4. 
280 See supra Part III.B.3 (comparing protections under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 with those 
required for citizens). 
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compel the invalidation of the regulation. Invalidating the regulation 
would not require the Court to weigh an alien’s liberty interest the 
same as a citizen’s, but the ruling would require some explicit 
weighting, creating a precedential benchmark. 
The Supreme Court should create such a precedent. It would be 
fairer and more humane to mentally ill aliens to protect them from 
unnecessary indefinite detention. Equally importantly, the precedent 
would provide a touchstone by which to evaluate other egregious 
denials of aliens’ due process protections. Providing aliens with 
greater legal protections allows them to step out of the shadows where 
they are subject to exploitation and prejudice.  
If the DHS regulation is invalidated and men like Hernandez–
Carrera are turned over to the states’ civil detention regimes, the DHS 
may ensure the public’s safety and reduce its workload. It could 
complete removal proceedings and decide before the completion of 
the alien’s sentence whether he had to be deported.281 If the DHS 
could not return him to his own country, it could let the local state 
officials handle the case the same as they do a citizen. If after 
completion of the state civil-commitment proceedings, a court found 
that the alien was not sufficiently dangerous to require incarceration, 
he would be freed subject to supervision, and the state would be 
spared a major, long-term expense. If the court decided that he 
required confinement, he would have access to the same treatment 
services available to citizens, and, as a result, he might again become 
a contributing member of society.  
If the Supreme Court is unable or unwilling to invalidate the DHS 
regulation on procedural due process grounds, Congress should do so 
based on its unfairness and its contribution to a two-class society. 
Throughout the world today there are men, women, and 
children interned indefinitely, awaiting trials which may 
never come or which may be a mockery of the word, because 
their governments believe them to be “dangerous.” Our 
Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago, 
can shelter us forever from the evils of such unchecked 
power.282 
                                                                                                                 
281 This would have the additional benefit of deporting removable aliens immediately at the 
conclusion of their prison term rather than waiting up to six months to determine removability. 
282 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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